A Method for the Specification, Composition, and Testing of Distributed Object Systems by Sivilotti, Paolo A. G.
A Method for the Specication Composition and Testing
of Distributed Object Systems
Thesis by
Paolo AG Sivilotti
In Partial Fulllment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena California

Submitted December  	
ii
c
  
Paolo A
G
 Sivilotti
All Rights Reserved
iii
 O frati dissi  che per cento milia
perigli siete giunti a loccidente
a questa tanto picciola vigilia
di nostri sensi che del rimanente
non vogliate negar lesperenza
di retro al sol del mondo sanza gente
Considerate la vostra semenza	
fatti non foste a viver come bruti
ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza
Dante Inferno XXVI 
iv
vAcknowledgements
Many people contributed to this research and I am thankful to them all
 I have been
fortunate to work with Mani Chandy my academic advisor
 His ability to extract the
elegant solution hidden behind the ugly hack or the clever insight camouaged as a mundane
question has been an inspiration
 Many thanks also to the other members of my thesis
committee Yaser AbuMostafa Jim Arvo Rajive Bagrodia and Alain Martin for taking
the time to review this thesis and to make helpful suggestions

Thanks to the other graduate students of our research group past and present John
Thornley Berna Massingill Adam Rifkin Eve Schooler Rajit Manohar Rustan Leino Pete
Carlin Joe Kiniry and Dan Zimmerman
 Their individual inuences shaped my research
environment here at Caltech
 Thanks also to Diane Goodfellow for her administrative
support

Thanks to the friends who helped make the good times fun and the less good times
bearable
 Especially John Thornley for many interesting and entertaining discussions some
even related to research	 and Mike Palmer for being a beacon of sanity in a crazy world

To Linda I owe a debt of gratitude for her kindness and understanding
 She has been
my closest condant telling me what I needed to hear and listening to what I had to say

Finally thanks to my family  in particular my parents for their unwavering love and
support Mass and Ruth for making sure I always had a home Marco for encouraging my
academic pursuits and Katie who has asked for so little and has given me so much

This research has been funded in part by an IBM Computer Science Fellowship an
NSERC  Fellowship DARPA grant NJ the NSF under Cooperative Agree
ment No
 CCR and AFOSR grant F

vi
vii
Abstract
The formation of a distributed system from a collection of individual components requires
the ability for components to exchange syntactically wellformed messages
 Several tech
nologies exist that provide this fundamental functionality as well as the ability to locate
components dynamically based on syntactic requirements
 The formation of a correct dis
tributed system requires in addition that these interactions between components be se
mantically wellformed
 The method presented in this thesis is intended to assist in the
development of correct distributed systems

We present a specication methodology based on three fundamental operators from tem
poral logic initially  next  and transient 
 From these operators we derive a collection
of higherlevel operators that are used for component specication
 The novel aspect of our
specication methodology is that we require that these operators be used in the following
restricted manner
 A specication statement can refer only to properties that are local to a single com
ponent

 A single component must be able to guarantee unilaterally the validity of the speci
cation statement for any distributed system of which it is a part

Specication statements that conform to these two restrictions we call certi
cates

The rst restriction is motivated by our desire for these component specications to be
testable in a relatively ecient manner
 In fact we describe a set of simplied certicates
that can be translated into a testing harness by a simple parser with very little programmer
intervention
 The second restriction is motivated by our desire for a simple theory of
composition If a certicate is a property of a component that certicate is also a property
of any system containing that component

Another novel aspect of our methodology is the introduction of a new temporal operator
that combines both safety and progress properties
 The concept underlying this operator
viii
has been used implicitly before but by extracting this concept into a rstclass operator we
are able to prove several new theorems about such properties
 We demonstrate the utility
of this operator and of our theorems by using them to simplify several proofs

The restrictions imposed on certicates are severe
 Although they have pleasing conse
quences as described above they can also lead to lengthy proofs of system properties that
are not simple conjunctions
 To compensate for this diculty we introduce collections of
certicates that we call services
 Services facilitate proof reuse by encapsulating common
component interactions used to establish various system properties

We experiment with our methodology by applying it to several extended examples

These experiments illustrate the utility of our approach and convince us of the practicality
of componentbased distributed system development
 This thesis addresses three parts of
the development cycle for distributed object systems i	 the specication of systems and
components ii	 the compositional reasoning used to verify that a collection of components
satisfy a system specication and iii	 the validation of component implementations
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Chapter 
Introduction
 Background
Distributed programs are parallel programs with physically distributed components
 Each
component can be viewed as an independent thread of control that can operate on local
data can communicate with other components and can suspend and resume execution

Distributed components do not share state the local data of one component is not visible
to other components
 Distributed solutions are appropriate when the system must interact
with physically distributed computational entities
 For example components may be bound
to remote sensors and actuators in a dynamic control application to human engineers in
a collaborative application or to specic processor memory and display resources in a
scientic application

Distributed systems are becoming more prevalent
 With the proliferation of worksta
tions and of networks of these machines there is an established hardware base for these
applications
 By bridging large physical distances between users networked computers are
a signicant communication resource
 The explosion of the World Wide Web   has
been dramatic evidence of the potential in exploiting networks
 In addition to information
exchange there is also considerable interest in distributed collaborative commercial and
entertainment applications
 Distributed programming is poised to enter the mainstream of
commodity software

One methodology that is useful for managing the complexity of distributed systems is
object orientation  
 This is a technique of program design that focuses attention
on the data being manipulated  
 Objectoriented languages such as C  and
Oberon 	 contain sophisticated mechanisms for supporting userdened data types
known as classes
 One of these mechanisms encapsulation provides the ability to collect
data and functionality within logical units and to separate the implementation of these
units from their interface
 A class interface is a specication for how instances of the class
ie objects	 can be manipulated
 Thus an interface is an abstract representation of the
contained data
 This support for userdened data types is one of the key characteristics that
make objectoriented languages helpful for building complex systems such as distributed
ones
 In a distributed objectoriented system an object can be used to represent a single
component of the system

Commercial objectbased frameworks for developing distributed systems typically use
class declarations to verify a syntactic consistency between components
 A class declaration
of one component is used to verify that the component responds to a particular message or
method invocation	
 In recent years an industrywide standard known as CORBA  has
emerged for objectbased distributed system construction
 This standard overcomes many
of the diculties of connecting components in a heterogeneous environment by permitting
them to communicate in a universal language

 Motivation
Even with the help of standards and objectoriented techniques for managing complexity
writing correct distributed programs remains a dicult task
 Formal verication of sequen
tial programs benets from a wellunderstood principle of compositionality
 This principle
allows subprograms to be veried independently
 Even with this advantage however rigor
ous application of formal methods in large sequential programs is prohibitively expensive

For distributed programs the problem is even harder since the rules for composition are
more complicated
 Reasoning about an individual component requires considering its inter
actions with the other components in the system
 As a result rigorous proofs of distributed
programs can be complex and time consuming
 At the same time the complexity of these
interactions makes the informal development of distributed systems more error prone than
that of sequential systems
 Therefore programmers of distributed systems can benet
greatly from the use of formal arguments in reasoning about the correctness of their appli
cations
 The challenge is to make these techniques of formal verication practical for the
mainstream development of distributed systems

In this thesis we explore a practical method for supporting the development of correct
distributed programs
 We propose a methodology for component specication based on a
collection of semantic constructs
 These semantic constructs are used to express properties
of individual components which can then be composed to derive properties of the system
as a whole
 Our methodology can be viewed as an extension to the objectbased approach
of many commercial frameworks for distributed system development
 The CORBA stan
dard and its compliant implementations	 provides a practical vehicle for our methodology
although its applicability is not restricted to this context
 The theoretical contributions of
this thesis are motivated by the desire for practical utility while the pragmatic contributions
are motivated by the desire for logical consistency

 Our Semantic Constructs
We dene three fundamental constructs for the specication of component behavior
 The
rst is the initially operator
 This operator describes the set of possible initial states
for the system
 The second is the next operator
 This operator describes given a set of
system states the set of possible system states after the execution of a single action
 The
third is the transient operator
 This operator describes a predicate on system states that
if true is guaranteed to be false eventually
 Together these three operators form the basis
of our specication language
 From these basic building blocks we derive a collection of
higher level and perhaps more familiar	 operators such as stable and   pronounced
leadsto 	
 In addition we derive a new operator follows  wellsuited to the description
of systems with monotonic behavior

We make use of these specication constructs in a restricted manner
 A specication statement can refer only to state that is local to a single component

 A single component must be able to guarantee unilaterally the validity of the speci
cation statement for any distributed system of which it is a part

Specication statements that conform to these two restrictions we call certi
cates

The requirement that certicates refer only to state local to a single component has a
signicant consequence A certicate can be tested within the context of a single component

Because components in a distributed system do not share state testing general system
properties at runtime requires gathering information from multiple address spaces
 Also
careful attention must be given to the protocol used to gather this information in order to
preserve its consistency
 The locality of certicates however means that these properties
can be tested and monitored simply by an examination of local state
 In fact we will see
how certicates can be used to automatically generate the code required to test and monitor
a component implementation

The requirement that certicates be unilaterally guaranteed by a component also has
a signicant consequence If a component is veried to implement a certicate this veri
cation argument applies regardless of the system of which the component is a part
 That
is the certicate is a property of any system that contains the corresponding component

Thus one property of any system is the conjunction of the certicates of the constituent
components
 This promotes proof reuse an essential element of making formal methods
practical in the marketplace

Many interesting system properties however are not simply conjunctions of local com
ponent properties ie disjunction may be required	
 The maintenance of these system
properties requires the coordination of multiple components
 Components exchange mes
sages to achieve a system goal or maintain a system invariant
 We introduce the notion of
a service as a reusable abstraction of a coordination paradigm
 Two services are presented
in detail tokens indivisible units	 and logical clocks monotonic counters and time stamps
of messages	
 This is not an exhaustive list it is meant to illustrate how paradigms of
component interaction can be captured in services and how the specication and use of
these services is integrated in our methodology

 Contributions
The contribution of this thesis is fourfold

 A new specication methodology based on certicates is introduced
 This method
ology is based on a collection of wellknown operators but adds some restrictions on
their use
 These restrictions result in two advantages testability and a simple rule
for composition
 Several extended examples are presented as an exploration of the
practical utility of this methodology


 A new temporal operator follows  is dened
 This operator combines both safety
and progress properties
 It can be used to succinctly describe and reason about
systems with monotonic state
 Several theorems are given for manipulating this op
erator and examples are presented illustrating the conciseness of proofs based on this
operator


 The use of certicates for testing and debugging component implementations is exam
ined
 We present a characterization of a restricted class of certicates that permits the
automatic generation of a testing harness for component implementations
 This har
ness consisting of assertions and trace recordings can detect the violation of certain
component properties and can warn of the possible violation of others
 The capac
ity to generate this testing harness automatically is therefore a great benet to the
programmer debugging an implementation


 The abstraction of component coordination paradigms as services is explored
 Two
services tokens and logical clocks	 are specied and the corresponding component
specications given
 Services represent basic protocols whereby a collection of com
ponents maintains or establishes a system property

	 A Simple Example
 The Shared Queue
This section presents a small example illustrating our approach to component specication

This example is intended to give the reader a avor for the specication language presented
in the thesis
 The simplicity of this example permits the application of many di!erent
specication methodologies apart from our own

Consider a component designed to store a queue of integers
 This queue is shared among
other components in the system
 These components may add an integer to the queue or
request the deletion of the integer at the head of the queue
 For this simple example we
do not address the use of the values in the queue

The declaration of this component in a CORBAcompliant system is given in Pro
gram 

 This declaration is used by the underlying runtime system to provide a variety
of crucial functionalities for example the typechecking of procedure calls to remote ob
jects the marshaling of arguments for transmission over the network and the instantiation
or retrieval of the target object when a remote request is received

interface Queue 
oneway void add in long i add an element to the tail of queue
oneway void remove  delete the element at the head of queue

Program 
 A CORBA declaration of a queue object

This declaration does not however provide any information about the behavior of the
component
 The manner in which this component can be used must be inferred from an
informal English description and the names chosen for the operations
 The inference of
semantics from informal descriptions is dangerous as such descriptions can be vague or
ambiguous
 For example it is not clear what e!ect a remove operation has on a Queue
component that contains no elements
 Is it simply ignored or is it stored as a request to
delete an element as soon as one is available for deletion
We extend the syntactic component declaration given above with our semantic con
structs
 An example of a component description for Queue is given in Program 

 This
description relates the state of the component as stored in its local variable	 to the op
erations that are performed
 The rst certicate denes the length of the queue Q	
given the number of add and remove operations that have been performed delnadd
and delnremove respectively	
 The second certicate denes the value of each element
of the queue Qi	 given the sequence of elements added Dadd	 and the number of
remove operations that have been performed delnremove	
 Notice that these certi
cates refer only to local values and that their validity can be unilaterally guaranteed by a
correct implementation

Component Queue 
local vars 	 Q  sequence of int Queue of integers
rpc targets 	 addint unordered
remove unordered
certificates 	
Invariant
Q 	 MAXdelnadd  delnremove 
Invariant
Ai  	 i  Q  Qi 	 Daddidelnremove

Program 
 Component description for a shared queue

The relationship of these values is graphically presented in Figure 

 This certicate
based description eliminates any ambiguity concerning the behavior of the Queue compo
nent
 A remove operation is never ignored
 If the queue is empty the next element added
will be immediately discarded

x x x x
2 1 6 2
0 65
0 65D(add)
deln(remove)
Q
x x x x
2 1 6 2 0 6 235
x x x x x x x xdeln(remove)
D(add)
Q empty
Figure 
 The state of the queue is determined by the sequence of add operations and
the number of remove operations

The component description for a queue that disregards or drops 	 requests to remove
an element when it is empty is given in Program 

 The external interface for this
QueueDrop component is the same as that for the Queue component
 The di!erence is in
the local state maintained by these components the latter maintains a count of the number
of elements removed from the queue	 and in the component specication as given by the
certicates
 The rst three certicates for the QueueDrop component dene the value of the
variable removals
 The initially certicate species that the initial value of removals is

 The next properties that follow require respectively that while the queue is empty
the value of removals be constant and that while the queue is nonempty its value increase
as remove requests are received
 The last two certicates dene the length of the queue
and the values of the elements in the queue given the sequence of add operations and
the value of the removals variable

Component QueueDrop 
local vars 	 Q  sequence of int Queue of integers
removals  int number of successful removals
rpc targets 	 addint unordered
remove unordered
certificates 	
Initially
removals 	 
removals 	 k  Q 	  Next removals 	 k
removals 	 delnremove  k  Q   Next removals 	 delnremove  k
Invariant
Q 	 delnadd  removals
Invariant
Ai  	 i  Q  Qi 	 Daddiremovals

Program 
 Alternate component description for a shared queue

This small example is meant to illustrate the nature of component specication through
the use of our certicates
 These certicates can be mapped to a testing and debugging
infrastructure
 This mapping is presented in Chapter 
 These specications can also
be used in compositional proofs to establish properties of systems built up from these
components
 Extended examples of such proofs are given in Chapters  and 

 Design Decisions
There are many choices made in the design of the methodology we present
 Di!erent choices
could have been made resulting in a di!erent methodology perhaps applicable to di!erent
models of computation
 The principal design decisions are outlined below together with a
short discussion of the tradeo!s involved

Asynchronous Messages All messages in our model of computation are asynchronous

That is a component continues to execute after sending a message
 In systems with globally
distributed components the round trip communication delays associated with synchronous
messages can be signicant
 For these systems we expect asynchronous semantics to be
the norm
 The choice of asynchronous messaging also simplies our model of execution
by permitting us to treat methods as atomic
 A component responds to the delivery of a
message by possibly changing local state and by possibly sending one or more messages

On the other hand there are cases for which synchronous semantics are more convenient
eg for a method that returns data to the invoker	
 In these cases the synchrony can be
simulated with a callback protocol

The Role of Time We do not explicitly include the physical passage of time in our model
of computation
 Our methodology does not permit the expression of realtime constraints

One can assert that action X will occur eventually  but not for example that action X
will occur in the next two minutes 
 This approach is commonly taken in temporal logics
and has the advantage of simplifying component renement
 Furthermore most networks
used for noncritical systems do not provide realtime guarantees for message delivery
 On
the other hand a specication augmented with time guarantees would indicate to a client
how long to wait before determining that a broken component is unresponsive

FaultFree Channels We consider only channels that deliver messages without loss
duplication or corruption
 There is no bound on the length of time required to deliver a
message but the message is eventually delivered
 Also bu!ers for incoming messages are
assumed to be innite
 These assumptions simplify the presentation by obviating arguments
concerning faulty delivery

Message Reception Our model does not contain an explicit bu!er of delivered but
unreceived messages
 That is a component cannot probe to determine whether a particular
message has been delivered and cannot selectively choose which messages to receive
 This
model is inspired by oneway remote procedure calls
 If the ability to process messages in
a particular order is required a component can implement and maintain a mailbox into
which all delivered messages are placed and from which the component selects the next
message to process

 Thesis Structure
In Chapter  we dene our model of computation
 The notions of system state component
actions and computations are formalized
 The messagepassing layer whereby components
interact is described informally
 The CORBA standard for distributed objectbased system
development is discussed briey
 This commercial standard provides a practical context for
the specication methodology we propose
 This chapter also introduces the notation that
will be used in the remainder of the thesis

In Chapter  we describe the fundamental elements for component specication cer
ticates
 The fundamental certicates  initially  next  and transient 	 are dened and
a collection of higher level operators derived
 These certicates are then used to formalize
the channel properties of the message passing layer along with some corollaries of these
properties
 Finally we present and characterize some special cases which we call simple
certi
cates of these fundamental certicates
 Finally some special cases of these fundamen
tal certicates are presented and characterized
 This subset of certicates we call simple
certi
cates

In Chapter  we examine more closely the follows operator introduced in the previous
chapter
 This is a new operator that combines both safety and progress properties in a
single expression
 Some theorems for the manipulation of expressions involving follows
are presented and proven
 As an illustration of the use of this operator a succinct proof
of a canonical distributed problem the earliest meeting time problem	 is given
 To further
illustrate the utility of follows  we use the theorems of this chapter to prove the corollaries
of the channel properties given in the previous chapter

In Chapter  we describe how certicatebased specications can be used for the test
ing and debugging of component implementations
 For each fundamental certicate the
framework for its translation into a collection of auxiliary variables and runtime asser
tions is given
 Simple certicates enjoy an automatic mapping into a complete testing and
runtime warning harness for a component
 For properties that can be tested ie safety
properties	 this harness is used to generate an exception when the property is violated
 For
properties that cannot be tested ie progress properties	 this harness is used to generate
runtime warnings and traces that are useful for debugging when a component is suspected
of being erroneous

In Chapter  we introduce services
 Services are frequentlyused paradigms for compo
nent interaction and coordination
 Two services are presented in detail tokens and logical
clocks
 Each represents a system invariant that cannot be unilaterally guaranteed by a

single component and hence cannot be captured by a single components certicates
 An
extended example is given that illustrates the use of services in particular tokens	 in the
development of a larger system

In Chapters  and  we put our specication methodology to the test using it to develop
two extended examples
 The rst is a distributed auction in which components submit bids
until a winner and price are established
 The second is a distributed branch and bound tree
search in which components are given subtrees to search as well as periodic updates on
the best bound found
 These chapters illustrate both the certicatebased specication of
individual components as well as the compositional proofs of these specications to establish
properties of the entire system

In Chapter  we outline some related work
 Our research is compared with some of the
other componentbased e!orts towards correct distributed system construction

In Chapter  we conclude with a summary of our ndings and a discussion of the
utility of our approach
 Future research directions are also outlined


Chapter 
Model of Computation
In this chapter we dene our model of computation
 Components and the messagepassing
layer through which they interact are presented operationally
 The notions of system state
a component action and a computation are presented
 A commercial instance of this model
the CORBA standard for distributed objectbased system development is discussed
 This
commercial standard provides a practical context for the specication methodology we
propose
 This chapter also introduces the notation and notational conventions that will be
used in the remainder of the thesis

 Operational Overview of Model
In this section we give an informal operational overview of our model of computation
 The
model is quite general and is satised by a variety of commercially available systems
 The
goal of this section is to introduce some of the terminology and give some context for the
kinds of systems addressed in this thesis

  Component Implementation
A distributed system consists of a collection of components
 Components are implemented
by programs that each reside in a single address space have local state and have a thread
of control
 We dene an implementation object to be such a program
 That is an imple
mentation object is a component that resides in a single address space

An implementation object is an object in the traditional sense It can be seen as a
collection of data and functions called methods	 that manipulate this data
 One of these
methods is designated as the constructor
 The constructor is executed when the implemen

run-time system
signals from
local data: Q
constructor: Queue(){...}
Component Queue
add(int){...}
remove(){...}
Figure 
 Each method is a target for signals from the runtime system

tation object is rst instantiated
 The other methods are executed as a result of signals
generated by the runtime system
 They are identied by a function name and a list of
argument types

For example consider the component discussed in Section 
 of the previous chapter
that implements a queue
 This component has local data the variable Q	 and three methods
a constructor a method to enqueue an element addint	 and a method to dequeue an
element remove	
 The last two methods are executed in response to signals from the
runtime system
 In Figure 
 each is depicted as a target for these signals

An implementation object is always in one of two states active or idle
 Initially it is
active
 An active implementation object has an executing thread of control and can perform
the following operations

 It can change any element of its local state including becoming idle	


 It can send messages to components in the system
 A message is a request for the
target implementation object to execute one of its methods

The local state of an implementation object includes the values of all its variables the
history of messages that it has sent and of messages that have been delivered to it as well
as whether it is active or idle

An idle implementation object on the other hand does nothing except wait for a signal

A signal is generated either by the delivery of a message or by the runtime system in
response to some stimulus by the environment eg an instrument detects a certain critical
pressure or a countdown timer expires	
 A signal causes an idle implementation object to
become active and begin executing the method specied by the signal

In our simple model only an idle implementation object can detect a signal
 An active
one cannot probe the runtime system to discover if a signal is pending


   Component Interaction The MessagePassing Layer
Each method of a component corresponds to a target for signals by the runtime system
as described above
 We call these targets RPC targets since they correspond to an inter
face for remote procedure calls RPCs	
 These RPC targets are the mechanism whereby
one component can invoke methods of another
 A component invokes other components
methods by sending a message that species i	 which method is to be invoked ii	 the
arguments to this method and iii	 the identity of the component sending the message

The messagepassing layer is responsible for transporting this message to its destination
and signaling the appropriate RPC target

For example if Storage is a reference to an instance of the Queue component described
above an RPC invocation in an implementation language such as C might take the
form
Storageadd
We consider the identity of the sender to be implicitly part of the invocation

Component methods do not have a return value
 The action of invoking an RPC is
nonblocking
 The message is sent and the sending component continues execution immedi
ately
 A method with a return value can be implemented with a callback protocol
 The
invocation of the method includes the identity of the invoker
 When the method completes
a message is sent to the invoker containing the result
 By waiting for this result to be
returned the invoker achieves the e!ect of synchronous semantics
 In order to present the
simplest model with general applicability we do not include synchronous semantics in our
model directly

The messages exchanged by components can be viewed as either oneway RPC requests
or as messages on asynchronous channels with innite slack
 The two models are equivalent
and we will use the associated terminology interchangeably

Channels are guaranteed to deliver messages without loss duplication or corruption

This delivery is guaranteed to occur in some nite but unbounded time
 We do not specify
as part of the model whether or not messages are delivered in the order sent
 Some imple
mentations of the messagepassing layer may provide ordered delivery others may not
 We
refer to this characterization of the messagepassing layer as the delivery discipline
 Other
delivery disciplines are possible such as faulty or noisy channels but are not addressed
here

We associate a channel with a history of actions a sequence D of deliveries and a
sequence S of sends
 We will also use the following functions on these histories

 delp and sentp 
 The former latter	 predicate is true exactly when the history
contains a delivery send	 action

 deln and sentn 
 The former latter	 integer function is the number of delivery send	
actions in the history

 del and sent 
 The former latter	 function returns the value of the last message
delivered sent	
 To refer to a particular delivery send	 action in the history the
sequence D  S 	 is subscripted
 For example D   is the value of the rst message
delivered and S sentn    is the value of the last message sent
 When there has
not been a delivery send	 action the value of del  sent 	 is still dened it is an
arbitrary value chosen from the message type of the channel

 delm 
 This function returns the value of the greatest message delivered
 It is used
in conjunction with monotonic channels and hence the message type has an ordering
relation	

A channel is uniquely identied by three things i	 the identity of the sender ii	 the
identity of the receiver and iii	 the name of the RPC target that is the destination
 The
application of the above functions then species these pieces of information
 For example
for a component S and a component R with method m  delnS Rm	 is the number of
messages that have been delivered on the channel from S to R at RPC target m 
 Often
these functions will be used in a context in which one or more of these parts of the channel
identity can be understood implicitly from context in which case that part will be omitted

  Component Descriptions
In an objectoriented programming language an object is described by an interface decla
ration
 Similarly in our model of distributed systems a component is described by what we
call a component description
 A component description contains the following information
i	 a declaration of constructed types used in declarations of local variables and constants
as well as in arguments of the components methods ii	 a list of local constants iii	 a list
of local variables iv	 a list of RPC targets v	 a list of components to which this compo
nent can send messages and vi	 a list of certicates
 When a particular list is empty the
corresponding entry in the component description is omitted
 Syntactically a component
description has the form given in Program 


We do not present a strict formalization of the syntax of component descriptions
 The
notation used is a mixture of some common structures from popular programming languages

Component component name 
local types 	 declarations of constructed types
local const 	 declarations of local constants
local vars 	 declarations of local variables
rpc targets 	 list of method signatures delivery and sender disciplines
neighbors 	 list of components
certificates 	 list of certificates

Program 
 Syntax of a component description

such as C and Pascal
 For example variables are declared in a Pascal style with a variable
name followed by a colon and the type of the variable
 Comments begin with  in the
style of C comments

The fundamental types are those of many programming languages characters integers
and oating point values
 The constructed types are also familiar structures arrays
sequences and sets of fundamental or constructed types
 Components are themselves types

The rst section of a component description allows these constructed types to be named

These names can then be used in the declaration of methods and local variables

As an example recall the component description given in Chapter  and repeated here
in Program 
	
 There are no local types in this description because no constructed type are
named ie the only argument to a method is a fundamental type and the only local variable
has type sequence of integers	
 This component has a single local variable a sequence of
integers called Q
 Next the RPC targets addint and remove are listed
 The unordered
qualication that appears after each RPC target refers to the message delivery discipline
that is assumed ie unordered but reliable delivery of messages	
 The certicates section
contains properties that will be discussed in Chapter  where the meanings of Invariant
delnadd delnremove and Daddi are all dened	
 The remaining symbols such
as MAX the length of a sequence Q and the universal quantication Ai  p	i are
assumed to be understood from common mathematical notation and usage

 StateBased Model
A fair interleaving semantics is used to represent the behavior of a distributed system

That is a computation is dened to be an innite sequence of actions
 Each action in the
sequence is an action performed by a component in the system
 The fairness requirement
is that if an action is enabled eventually either the action appears in the trace ie is

Component Queue 
local vars 	 Q  sequence of int Queue of integers
rpc targets 	 addint unordered
remove unordered
certificates 	
Invariant
Q 	 MAXdelnadd  delnremove 
Invariant
Ai  	 i  Q  Qi 	 Daddidelnremove

Program 
 Component description for a shared queue

allowed to execute	 or it ceases to be enabled
 Our model permits three kinds of actions
i	 a component can modify its local state ii	 a component can send messages to other
components and iii	 the messagepassing layer can deliver a message
 We consider the
delivery of a message to be atomic with the execution of the associated method
 Similarly
we consider the entire execution of a method to be an atomic action
 Hence methods are
required to terminate

The state of the system as dened above is the state of the individual components
and the state of the messagepassing layer
 For the message delivery disciplines described
above the state of the messagepassing layer is functionally determined by the state of the
individual components
 The computation begins in some initial state where the message
passing layer has not delivered any messages and the component states are all determined by
their initialization
 Each action then maps the current state to a new state
 A computation
therefore can either be viewed as a sequence of actions or as the corresponding sequence of
states

As is common with such semantics we permit stuttering  page 
 That is a
system is allowed to do nothing for an arbitrary but nite number of steps

 An Instance of the Model
 The CORBA Standard
This section presents a commercially available product that can be used as an implementa
tion of our model as described above

  History
The Object Management Group OMG	 was formed in  as a consortium of industries
universities and research laboratories
 Its membership currently numbers more than 

software vendors developers and researchers including Apple Computer Digital Equip
ment HewlettPackard International Business Machines Microsoft Netscape Communi
cations Novell Silicon Graphics and SunSoft
 The mandate of this organization has been
to promote the theory and practice of object technology for the development of distributed
computing systems
 One of the most signicant contributions by the OMG has been a
standard for distributed objectbased systems known as CORBA 
 Introduced in 
the CORBA specication dened the middleware to support distributed object communi
cation
 Several implementations of this standard became available soon after
 Adopted in
 a revision of the specication CORBA 
	 dened the requirements for interoper
ability between these implementations
 Currently many commercial implementations of the
CORBA 
 standard are available such as Orbix by IONA	 VisiBroker by Visigenic	
SOMDSOM by International Business Machines	 ORB Plus by HewlettPackard	 and
Object Broker by Digital Equipment	

   Architecture and the IDL
At the core of CORBA is an object request broker that intercepts the dispatch of a method
invocation and is responsible for nding the target object that implements the method
marshaling and demarshaling the arguments activating the method and returning the
result
 In the language of the CORBA specication the component issuing the method
request is the client while the destination component of the request is the server

There are two mechanisms whereby this dispatch can occur
 The rst is via a dynamic
invocation interface
 This interface permits a client to construct a method invocation at
run time retrieving the method signature from an interface repository and appending the
required arguments to a dynamic structure before issuing the request
 The second mech
anism is via stub and skeleton code that is statically generated from an object interface
description
 A graphical representation of this process is given in Figure 


Both approaches require the denition of implementation object interfaces the former to
create repositories of interface information and the latter to generate the stub and skeleton
code	
 Part of the CORBA denition is a universal language for this purpose
 This language
known as IDL for Interface Denition Language	 provides the syntax required to describe
the signatures of methods that can be invoked on an object
 As an example recall the
shared queue example used in Chapter 
 The IDL denition of this object is repeated here
in Program 


All CORBA implementations include an IDL parser responsible for translating an IDL

dynamic
interface
dynamic
interface
stub
code
skeleton
code
Object Request Broker
ServerClient
Figure 
 Method Invocation in CORBA

interface Queue 
oneway void add in long i add an element to the tail of queue
oneway void remove  delete the element at the head of queue

Program 
 An IDL denition of the Queue interface

denition into stub code and skeleton code
 The stub code is a collection of functions
called by the client to invoke a remote method
 The invocation in the client code is then
identical to an invocation of a local method the only di!erence being that the target of the
invocation is a remote object
 The skeleton code is a framework that the implementor of
the server program completes
 In general for each method in the IDL denition a function
is created by the IDL parser that takes the required arguments
 It is the responsibility of
the programmer to code the body of the function so as to produce the desired result

For example consider the IDL denition of Queue in Program 

 IBMs SOMDSOM
implementation of the CORBA standard produces the skeleton code given in Program 

from this IDL denition
 The parser adds some SOMspecic code and provides two function
templates for the programmer to complete one for add and one for remove	

  Other Implementations
Although CORBA provides a natural context for the methodology proposed in this the
sis our methodology is not conned to this context
 Indeed any implementation of the
model for distributed systems presented in this chapter is suitable for the application of our


 This file was generated by the SOM Compiler and Emitter Framework

 Generated using
 SOM Emitter emitxtm 


ifndef SOMModulequeueSource
define SOMModulequeueSource
endif
define QueueClassSource
include queue
xih
SOMScope void SOMLINK addQueue somSelf Environment ev
long i

 QueueData somThis 	 QueueGetDatasomSelf 
QueueMethodDebugQueueadd

SOMScope void SOMLINK removeQueue somSelf Environment ev

 QueueData somThis 	 QueueGetDatasomSelf 
QueueMethodDebugQueueremove

Program 
 SOMDSOM code skeleton for Queue


approach to component specication and composition
 Other available implementations
include Java  with RMI CC   Fortran M  PVM  and MPI  to
name a few
 To avoid confusion in the presentation a single practical context is used in
this thesis namely the CORBA standard

 Notation and Conventions
  Functions and Operators
The usual mathematical and logical operators are used
 Function application is denoted
with the inx 
 operator
 For example the function f applied to x is written f  x 

Since predicates are functions from the state space to the booleans	 a similar notation
is used for predicates
 For example the predicate p applied to state s is written p s 

Function application associates to the left
 For example stable p C should be read as
stable p	 C 

The usual binding powers are given to operators

   function application	

 

 arithmetic operators including " 	 with their usual binding power

   

   

 	
The temporal operators introduced in Chapter  all have the lowest binding power
below 	 	

   Quantication
Quantication of a binary associative commutative operator op over a set of values is
denoted  op dummies  range  term 	  where dummies is a list of dummy variables
range is the range of quantication and term is the term of quantication
 For example
the following formula is an expression that all even natural numbers satisfy the predicate
p 
  n  n 
 IN  even n  p n 	

The logical operators  and   when used as quantication operators will usually be
written as  and  respectively
 Similarly  will be written as   in accordance with
common usage
 For example the universal quantication of a predicate p over all even
natural numbers given above will be denoted
n  n 
 IN  even n  p n 	
Often the type of the dummy eg the natural numbers in the preceding examples	 will
be understood from context
 If the entire range is understood from context an abbreviated
notation is used
n  p n 	
Universal quantication over the state space will be denoted by the everywhere brack
ets as in 
 For example consider predicates x   and x   on a state space S that
contains a variable x 
 The truth of the latter predicate is implied by the truth of the former

We write x    x    as a shorthand for  s  s 
 S  x    x   	 s 	 

We also adopt the convention that formulas with unbound dummies are implicitly uni
versally quantied over these dummies
 For example the formula stable x " k	 where k
is a dummy should be read as  k  stable x " k	 	 

  Proof Format
Our proof format is based on 
 It gives a justication or hint	 for each step
 For
example the validity of p  q  might be established by a proof of the form
p
	 f hint why p 	 r  g
r
 f hint why r  q  g
q
Since our temporal operators next and   introduced in Chapter  can be part of
a weakening implication chain we extend this notation to include these operators
 For
example the property p   q	 C might be established by a proof of the form
p
 f hint why p  r  g
r

  f hint why r   q	 C g
q

Chapter 
Certicates and Specication
In this chapter we dene our principal specication construct the certicate
 Certicates
are used both to specify and to test individual components
 Fundamental certicates are
introduced and some examples are given illustrating how these certicates can specify var
ious component properties
 These certicates are also used to formally specify the channel
properties in our model of communication
 We then introduce simplications based on
restricted classes of certicates

 Component Specication
Recall that in our model there are  types of actions i	 a component can modify its local
state ii	 a component can send messages to other components and iii	 the messagepassing
layer can deliver a message
 As dened in Chapter  a computation is an innite sequence
of such actions  pages 
 We identify a computation with the corresponding innite
sequence of system states

A specication is a precise formal description of the behavior of a software system

We characterize the behavior of a system by the set of possible computations the system
can generate
 A specication therefore denes a set of permissible computations and a
system is said to implement a specication if every computation of the system is one of
the computations permitted by the specication  Chapter 
 We will use predicates on
computations known as properties as specication statements

Recall that components do not share state
 This means that any action in the system
can a!ect at most a single components state
 Some actions  namely communication
actions  may also modify the state of the messagepassing layer
	 Consider the three
types of actions dened in our model

Readwrite actions Variables are local to a component so the modication of a variable
modies only the state of that component

Message sending Sending a message modies the state of the outgoing channel
 The
state of the component sending the message is also modied eg the history of
messages sent is updated	

Message delivery Similarly the delivery of a message modies the state of the incoming
channel and the state of the component receiving the message

Hence a components behavior can be dened in terms of its local state the local variables
the messages it has sent and the messages it has received

We dene a component certi
cate to be a specication statement that meets two re
strictions

 The expressions contained in the statement involve only the local variables of the
component and the messages sent by and delivered to that component


 The validity of the statement does not depend on the environment in which the
component is placed

Certicates enjoy a signicant property If a certicate is a property of a component it
is also a property of any system that contains that component
 In the language of 
certicates are examples of existscomponent properties

Despite the fact that specications are meant to be visible to a components environment
the presence of socalled local variables in these specication statements is not a cause for
concern
 These variables are elements of the component description as dened in Chapter 	
and not part of the implementation
 These variables are therefore specication also known
as ghost auxiliary or thought 	 variables and including them in the specication
does not violate any principles of information hiding

There are two parts to the specication of concurrent systems safety and progress
 An
example of a safety property is that the value of variable x is always positive
 A safety
property can be violated by a nite sequence of actions
 An example of a progress property
is that eventually the value of variable x is greater than 
 Unlike a safety property a
progress property cannot be violated by a nite sequence of actions
 We introduce two
fundamental constructs for dealing with safety  initially and next 	 and one for progress
 transient 	
 From these basic concepts we will derive two more constructs for expressing
safety  stable and invariant 	 and one more for progress leadsto written   	
 This

formal system is known to be sound and relatively complete 
 We will also derive a new
construct  follows 	 that simultaneously expresses both safety and progress properties
 We
will then use these constructs to specify the channel properties of our model of computation
and derive some useful corollaries

 Safety
  Certicate initially
As dened in Chapter  a computation is a sequence of states
 The rst state is designated
the initial state
 The initially certicate is a predicate that holds in this initial state

That is the components of the system have been instantiated and have initialized their
local variables
 For a predicate p and a system C  we dene
initially p C
 
"  computations  s
i
 i    of C  p s

	
Function application associates to the left so we write initially p C for initially p	 C 

For example consider a component Philosopher that cycles between three states
thinking hungry and eating
 The current state is encoded in three boolean variables
thinking hungry and eating
 When rst instantiated the component is in the thinking
state
 This component property is written
initially thinking
The component to which a certicate applies will typically be understood from context

Where there is opportunity for confusion the component will be given explicitly
 For
example the following expression is a boolean
initially thinking  Philosopher
   Certicate next
Whereas the initially certicate describes the valid states at the beginning of a computa
tion the next certicate describes how a state in a computation constrains the state that
follows it

The specication statement p next q is a property of a component exactly when any
state satisfying p is immediately followed in the computation by a state satisfying q 

p next q	 C
 
"  computations  s
i
 i    of C 
 i  i    p s
i
 q  s
i 
	 	

We will refer to p and q as the prepredicate and postpredicate respectively

Recall from our description of the computational model in Chapter  that the actions
of the individual components are interleaved in a computation with actions of other com
ponents and of the underlying messagepassing layer
 Thus a certicate involving next
must allow for actions that do not change local state
 So given p next q  it follows that
p implies q 
p next q	 C  p  q  
	
The square brackets   	 are everywhere brackets  representing universal quanti
cation over all states

For example consider the component Philosopher from the previous section that cycles
between  states thinking hungry and eating
 To express that the component becomes
thinking after eating the following certicate is used
eating next eating  thinking
We dene next to have a lower binding power than equivalence and hence a lower binding
power than disjunction	

Notice that this certicate does not ensure that the component will ever stop eating

It may be the case that the component continues to eat indenitely
 The above certicate
says only that a state in which the component is eating is immediately followed by a state
in which either the component is still eating or the component is thinking
 The property
that the component will eventually stop eating is a progress property and is discussed in
Section 


The next operator has appeared in several forms including the co operator in 
the next operator in  and the   operator in temporal logic  

 Progress
 Certicate transient
A progress property states that something eventually happens
 We employ a single fun
damental certicate for expressing progress transient 
 A transient predicate is a pred
icate that once true is guaranteed to be falsied eventually
 The specication statement
transient p is a property of a component exactly when any state satisfying p is eventually

followed in the computation by a state satisfying p 

transient p C
 
"  computations  s
i
 i    of C 
 i  i    p s
i
  j  j  i  p s
j
	 	 	
For example consider once again the component Philosopher used in previous sections

To express the fact that a Philosopher does not eat forever we write the certicate
transient eating
  Use of transient
On casual consideration this property may appear to be of limited use as a certicate in our
model of computation recall that certicates are restricted to refer only to local variables
and channels	
 We have postulated distributed components with methods whose invocation
and execution occur as a single atomic action
 That is the action of the delivery of an
RPC request by the messagepassing layer and the execution of the corresponding method
occur as a single atomic block
 It seems then that any progress property will require the
cooperation of more than one component and hence cannot be unilaterally guaranteed by
a single component

It is important to remember however that there is not necessarily a onetoone relation
ship between components and implementation objects
 A single component may correspond
to multiple implementation objects
 It is the actions of the individual implementation ob
jects that occur as atomic blocks
 There are two important cases that give rise to multiple
object components composition and clocks

Case  Composition
Components are closed under parallel composition
 That is the parallel composition of
components yields a new component
 Even if the original components each correspond
to a single implementation object their composition does not
 For example consider two
simple components Increment and Double
 The rst component receives an RPC request
containing an integer increments the integer then sends the result in an RPC request to a
Double component
 The second component receives an RPC request containing an integer
doubles the integer then sends the result in an RPC request to a Consumer component

The descriptions of these components are summarized in Programs 
 
 and 


The behavior of Increment is dened strictly in terms of safety properties
 That is
there is a single atomic method inc
 The delivery of a message to this RPC target is

Component Increment 
rpc targets 	 inc int writeonce
neighbors 	 d  Component Double

Program 
 Description of the Increment component

Component Double 
rpc targets 	 dbl int writeonce
neighbors 	 c  Component Consumer

Program 
 Description of the Double component

atomic with the calculation of the new value and the sending of this new value on to the
neighbor d
 A possible trace of execution of this component is represented graphically in
Figure 

 Notice that every state is characterized by the same number of delivery and send
actions and by a particular mathematical relationship between these two sequences the
latter is an increment of the former	
 The behavior of Double is similarly dened strictly
in terms of safety properties

Now consider the composition of Increment and Double to form a new component

This composition binds the neighbor value d of the Increment component to a Double
component
 Pictorially this composition is depicted in Figure 

 One of the properties
of this new component is a progress property namely that the delivery of an RPC request
inc eventually results in a message being sent to the consumer
 More formally
transient delpinc	  sentpc result		
Operationally this temporal property is a result of the nonatomic	 communication that
occurs between the Increment and Double components

Component Consumer 
rpc targets 	 result int writeonce

Program 
 Description of the Consumer component
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 An example trace of execution for the Increment component
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Composition of Increment and Double
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Figure 
 Composition of Increment and Double components

Case  Clocks
The second case that gives rise to locally veriable transient properties is the use of clocks
by components
 A clock is often used to generate a timeout signal when the component is
interacting with the outside world eg a disk drive or a user	
 Such an environment may
or may never provide the required input
 To deal with this uncertainty a component can
use a timeout to terminate waiting for input that may never come

For example consider a distributed system that provides a simple twoway communica
tion link for users
 The link is established when a request by one user to initiate a session
is accepted by the other user
 The RPC targets involved in session initiation are shown in
Program 

 The simple topology of this application is illustrated in Figure 


A component that has received a request for a session noties the user and waits for a

Component Link 
rpc targets 	 request unary ordered
accept unary ordered
reject unary ordered
neighbors 	 n  Component Link

Program 
 Description of the Link component

n
User User
Link
n
Link
accept()
request()
reject()
request()
accept()
reject()
Clock Clock
Figure 
 Topology of communication link between users

decision whether to accept or reject the request
 The user however may not be present
and in this case the request should be rejected
 The component must therefore guarantee
that eventually a reply of some kind is sent
 This guarantee is expressed by the following
certicate
transient delprequest	  sentpn accept	  sentpn reject			
This guarantee can be implemented in any number of ways that provide a timeout signal

Another way to illustrate the role of clocks is to consider a representation of a compo
nents protocol
 A common representation of a protocol for a communicating system is that
of a nite state machine    where the transitions correspond to communication
actions ie the sending and receiving of messages	 
 Consider a typical clientserver
model where a server object waits in a dormant state for an RPC request
 When such

a request is delivered the appropriate method is executed possibly resulting in several
messages being sent	 and the server returns to its dormant state
 A protocol for such a
system is represented in Figure 

 Sending a message is denoted with a minus sign while
the delivery of a message is denoted with a plus sign

wait1 wait2
idle
+s;-c +t;-d+r;-b;-c+r;-a
+u;-a +v
Figure 
 A servers protocol in a clientserver system

As a consequence of our model of computation transitions from a state begin with the
delivery of a message
 These states idle wait and wait	 correspond to dormant states
where the object is waiting for the delivery of an RPC request
 The delivery may be followed
by some number of send actions

For a timeout the component uses the clock to generate a signal
 This signal is modeled
as the delivery of a message
 For example the protocol for the Link component is given in
Figure 

 In the state wait
 the component waits to receive a signal from either the user
or the clock
 If the user does not reply the link request is rejected
 Because the clock is
trusted to generate a signal the component can unilaterally guarantee that the state wait

is transient
transient wait
 Derived Certicates
 stable  invariant  Leadsto and
follows
 Certicate stable
A stable predicate is a predicate that once true remains true

stable p C
 
" p next p	 C

wait1
linked
user
-notify
+signal
from user
+signal
from user
idle
wait2
+signal
from clock
-request()
+request()
+reject() +accept()
-accept()
-reject()
Figure 
 Protocol for the Link component

An example of a stable property is that the system has terminated or that a message has
been delivered

  Certicate invariant
An invariant predicate is a stable predicate that is true initially

invariant p C
 
" initially p C  stable p C
There is a subtle distinction between the notion of invariant as described above and the
notion of always true
 In particular a predicate that is always true in a computation
may be too weak to be proven to be invariant using the above denition
 The distinction
centers around the consideration of reachable states and is eliminated by the adoption of a
substitution axiom similar to that of UNITY logic   

An example of an invariant property is that a variable is always positive
 Another
example is that in the Philosopher component exactly one of the booleans thinking
hungry and eating is true
invariant thinking 	 hungry 	 eating	  thinking  hungry  eating		

 Certicate Leadsto
A leadsto property such as p   q  expresses the fact that once p becomes true q is or
will be true  Section 


 Leadsto can be dened in terms of transience and next


A rule that we will use frequently in deriving leadsto properties is as follows
stable p C  transient p  q	 C  p   q	 C
 Certicate Follows
Consider two variables x and y of the same type and let this type have an ordering
relation  that denes a partial order ie the ordering relation is reexive transitive
and antisymmetric	
 The property x follows y expresses many things

 Both x and y are monotonically increasing


 The value of x does not exceed the value of y 


 If the value of y exceeds some constant then eventually the value of x will also
exceed that constant


 The di!erence between x and y is an upper bound on how much x can increase in
one step

The follows operator is dened in terms of stability invariance leadsto and a next
property

x follows y	 C
 
"  k  stable x  k	 C 	   k  stable y  k	 C 	
 invariant x  y	 C   k  y  k   x  k	 C 	
  k  y  k  x  k next x  k 	
The ordering relationship used on x and y will typically be understood from context
eg integers are ordered by lessthan and predicates are ordered by implication	
 If there
is a possibility for confusion however or if the follows property expresses a monotonically
nonincreasing relationship the ordering relation will be subscripted after follows  for
example x follows

y for integers x and y and x follows

y for sets x and y the
above denition is the denition of x follows

y 	

The follows operator is interesting as it combines both safety and progress properties

It can be used to succinctly dene the properties of some components and in particular

channels as will be seen in the next section	
 Some useful theorems for manipulating
follows properties as well as some example proofs using follows are given in Chapter 

	 Channel Properties
Using the safety and progress primitives introduced in Sections 
 
 and 
 we can now
formalize the messagepassing layer described operationally in the previous chapter
 We
associated a channel with a history of actions a sequence D of deliveries and a sequence
S of sends
 We also introduced the following functions on these histories
 delp and sentp 
 The former latter	 predicate is true exactly when the history
contains a delivery send	 action

 deln and sentn 
 The former latter	 integer function is the number of delivery send	
actions in the history

 del and sent 
 The former latter	 function returns the value of the last message
delivered sent	
 To refer to a particular delivery send	 action in the history the
sequence D  S 	 is subscripted
 For example D   is the value of the rst message
delivered and S sentn    is the value of the last message sent
 When there has
not been a delivery send	 action the value of del  sent 	 is still dened it is an
arbitrary value chosen from the message type of the channel

 delm 
 This function returns the value of the greatest message delivered
 It is used
in conjunction with monotonic channels and hence the message type has an ordering
relation	

We now present the channel properties that will be used in our proofs
 In the equations
that follow we will omit the argument ie the channel	 to this function
 First the
denitions given above are formalized
 Next the properties that depend on the message
delivery discipline ie ordered and unordered delivery	 are given
 Finally the properties
that depend on various sender disciplines ie writeonce and monotonic sends	 are given

The properties that follow from the messagedelivery discipline are independent of what if
any sender discipline is used
 Similarly the properties that follow from the sender discipline
are based on the weakest messagedelivery discipline unordered delivery	
 These properties
also hold with ordered delivery


	 Denitions Common to All Channel Types
Notation The notation jX j is used to represent the number of elements in sequence X 

Denitions We begin with the denitions of deln  sentn  delp  sentp  del  and sent 

deln " jD j
sentn " jS j
delp 	 deln  
sentp 	 sentn  
delp  del " D deln   
sentp  sent " S sentn   
The last two equations dene the values of del and sent only when there has been
an action in the corresponding history
 We prefer to work with total functions so we
adopt an untyped view of our specication language where undened values are determined
by Hilberts choice operator  representing an arbitrary value taken from the set of
possible values	
 This approach is similar to the TLA specication language  
 We
will take care not to reference these values in properties or proofs

	  Properties that Depend on MessageDelivery Discipline
Unordered Channels An unordered channel does not guarantee the preservation of the
order of sent messages
 It does guarantee however that messages arrive without loss or
duplication

Let v denote the ordering relationship between sequences corresponding to a subset
relationship between multisets
 That is a sequence X is below v 	 a sequence Y if and
only if every element X appears in Y with the same or greater multiplicity

X v Y
 
"  k  # i    i  jX j  X i  " k 	
 # i    i  jY j  Y i  " k 	 	
This messagedelivery discipline is characterized by the following channel property
D follows
v
S 
	
From this property we can derive the following corollaries
deln follows sentn 
	
delp follows sentp 
	

Ordered Channels An ordered channel guarantees the preservation of the order of sent
messages
 Messages arrive without loss or duplication

Let  denote the prex ordering relationship between sequences
 That is a sequence
X is below  	 a sequence Y if and only if X is a prex of Y 

X  Y
 
" jX j  jY j   i    i  jX j  X i  " Y i  	
This messagedelivery discipline is characterized by the following channel property
D follows

S 
	
This messagedelivery discipline is stronger than unordered message delivery
 That is
the following corollary can be derived from the channel property above
D follows
v
S 
	
Hence the corollaries given for unordered channels are also corollaries for ordered channels

In addition the following corollary can be derived
 j  j    deln  j  D j  " k follows sentn  j  S j  " k 	 
	
	 Properties that Depend on Sender Discipline
WriteOnce Channels A writeonce channel is a channel on which the sender sends at
most one message
 It is characterized by the following property
invariant sentn   	 
	
From this one property and the property of unordered channels we can derive the
following corollary
delp  del " k follows sentp  sent " k
Monotonic Channels A monotonic channel is a channel in which the sequence of sent
messages is monotonic
 We will give here only the properties of monotonically nondecreasing
channels
 The analogous properties exist for monotonically nonincreasing channels
 The
fundamental requirement that distinguishes this sender discipline is
invariant   i    i  sentn    S i   S i    	 
	
We make use of the function delm  the maximum message delivered

delp  delm " Max i    i  deln  D i  	 
	

Notice that for monotonic channels with an ordered messagedelivery discipline this func
tion is the same as del 
delp  delm " del
From the fundamental property of monotonic channels and the properties common to
all messagedelivery disciplines we can derive the following corollary
delp  delm  k follows sentp  sent  k
 Simple Certicates for Safety
Simple certicates are restricted forms of the general operators introduced above
 They have
the advantage of being suitable for automatic translation into runtime checks or warnings

Some of these simple certicates will be given a special syntax that will be dened using
standard BackusNaur notation 	


 Monotonicity
We say a variable is monotonic if in the course of a computation its value is monotonically
increasing or decreasing
 This property requires that a partial order be dened on the type
of the variable
 The ordering relation is typically understood from the type
 For example
if the variable is an integer the ordering relation is the usual  operator in the integers

If the variable is a character the ordering relation might be the alphabetic ordering

Monotonicity is an important property frequently used in the proofs of distributed and
sequential	 systems
 A common application of monotonicity is the denition of a metric
also known as a variant function	 for a computation
 A metric measures the distance in
some sense to a nal goal
 In conjunction with boundedness a monotonic metric is used
to establish that a computation never moves further from the nal goal

Monotonicity is a special case of a next property
 The fact that a variable x is mono
tonically increasing can be expressed as follows
n  x  n	 next x  n	 	 
	
We will use the following notation to express the simple certicate of monotonicity
monotonicup j monotonicdown  hexpressioni hcomponenti
The nal argument the component	 will usually be understood from context
 For example
Equation 
 can be written
monotonicup x

This notation has the advantage of eliminating the quantication that is required by the
next formulation

When the ordering relation on the type of the variable in question is not obvious it is
specied along with the monotonic certicate


  Boundedness
As mentioned above boundedness is often used in conjunction with monotonicity to help
establish termination
 The metric must be monotonically increasing decreasing	 but it
must also be nite and bounded above below	


As with monotonicity an ordering relation
is required for the type of the bound variable

Boundedness is a safety property
 It is a special case of an invariant property
 For
example the fact that a variable x is bounded above by some value B can be expressed as
follows
invariant x  B	
We do not introduce any special syntax to express boundedness

When the ordering relation on the type of the variable in question is not obvious it is
specied along with the boundedness certicate


 Unquantied Next
An unquanti
ed next property is one that does not contain any free variables
 For example
the certicate given in Section 

 to specify that the Philosopher component must
become thinking after eating was
eating next eating  thinking
This certicate does not require quantication over any variables
 The variables eating
and thinking are local variables of Philosopher and there are no dummy variables

No special syntax is required to distinguish these certicates
 They are simply a re
stricted form of general next properties


 Functional Next
A functional next property is one in which the values of the dummy variables are function
ally determined by the values of the component variables in the prepredicate of the next 

 
In addition the metric must not change by less than some positive delta This condition is frequently
obviated by choosing an integer metric

For example consider a component with two variables x and y and the following next
property
 k  x  y  y " k next x  k 	
The value of the dummy k  is functionally determined by the value of the component
variables in particular y	 in the prepredicate

Note that this property could be equivalently expressed as
 k  x  y  y  k next x  k 	
This formulation however does not functionally determine the value of the dummy for any
given values of the component variables

Consider the generic next property p next q with dummy variables taken from the
set I and component variables taken from the set V 
 We dene such a property to be a
functional next property exactly when
 i  i 
 I   f  p  i " f  V  	 	
The assymetry in choosing p rather than q to functionally determine the dummy variables
is justied by Equation 

 From this equation we know p  q  and hence if the dummy
variables are functionally determined by the postpredicate they are functionally determined
by the prepredicate as well and hence the property is a functional next property in the
sense dened above	

We adopt a variation of Hehners notation  for expressing functional next properties

We decorate the variables in the prepredicate with an apostrophe placed before the variable
name
 The next can then be replaced by an implication and the result is a predicate
on adjacent pairs of states in a computation
 We introduce the operator adjacent to
distinguish these predicates from predicates on a single state
 Let

p denote the predicate
that results from decorating the component variables in the predicate p 
 The property
p next q can then be written
adjacent 

p  q	
Because of the functional determination of the dummy variables they can be eliminated
in this expression by replacing them with a function on the component variables in the
prepredicate ie

p 	

For example consider the functional next at the beginning of this section
 k  x  y  y " k next x  k 	

Using our decoration of variables this property can be written
 k  adjacent 

x 

y 

y " k  x  k	 	
Replacing the dummy with the function on variables in the prepredicate we have
adjacent 

x 

y 

y "

y  x 

y	
In this case the property can be simplied
adjacent 

x 

y  x 

y	
Like monotonicity and boundedness this simple certicate has the advantage of not re
quiring universal quantication
 The use of the keyword adjacent and decorated variables
is a notational convenience that will be exploited in Chapter 

 Simple Certicates for Progress
Recall that a transient certicate contains a predicate that is guaranteed not to remain
true forever
 When used in conjunction with monotonicity and boundedness transience can
establish that a computation eventually reaches a xed point
 If the monotonic bounded
metric described above can be shown to eventually change value if it is below the bound
the metric eventually reaches the specied bound

Like next properties transient certicates can contain free variables that are implic
itly universally quantied over their range
 For example to express that a metric eventually
changes value the following certicate could be used
transient metric " m	
where m is a free variable

For two special cases however a free variable and universal quantication are not
needed
 These two kinds of transient properties we will call unquanti
ed transience and
functional transience
 Avoiding quantied expressions simplies the automatic runtime
support of these certicates as will be discussed in Chapter 	

 Unquantied Transience
An unquantied transient property is one that does not contain any free variables
 For
example the certicate given in Section 

 to specify that the Philosopher component
does not eat forever was
transient eating

This certicate does not require quantication over any variables
 The variable eating is
a local variable of Philosopher and there are no dummy variables

No special syntax is required to distinguish these certicates
 They are simply a re
stricted form of general transient expressions

  Functional Transience
A frequent use of quantication especially with regards to metrics	 is to express that the
value of an expression eventually changes
 The free variable is simply used as a placeholder

An example of such a certicate is the example used at the beginning of this section
transient metric " m	
where m is a free variable

This certicate is an example of a more general form of transient properties in which
the free variables are functionally determined by the transient predicate
 For any component
state there is at most one value for each free variable such that the transient predicate is
true
 We call this form of transient properties functional transient properties

In general a functional transient property with dummy variables taken from the set
I and component variables taken from the set V has the form
transient   i  i 
 I  i " f
i
 V 	  p I V 		
We will use the following syntax as an equivalent formulation of the above property
 i  i 
 I  i " f
i
 V 	 in transient p I V 	
For example the certicate concerning the variable metric could be written
m " metric in transient metric " m	
As another example consider a metric that is used to establish that a Philosopher com
ponent does not eat forever
 This metric is guaranteed to change so long as the component
remains in the eating state
 Such a property is captured by the certicate
m " metric in transient metric " m  eating	
Functional transient properties have a fundamental similarity to functional next
properties
 Because the free variables are functionally dened by the predicate univer
sal quantication is not required to express the property



Chapter 
Follows Properties
In this chapter we discuss the certicate follows introduced in the previous chapter
 This
certicate which to our knowledge is a new property combines both safety and progress

Some theorems are given that are useful for the manipulation of these properties
 As an
illustration of the use of follows  we succinctly prove a solution to the earliest meeting
time problem
 Also as a more involved manipulation of follows  we derive the corollaries
given as channel properties in the previous chapter Section 
	

 Basic Theorems
In this section we list some basic theorems for the manipulation of follows properties

Most theorems are given without proof as they can be easily derived from the denition
of follows 
 Two theorems monotonicity and least xed point	 are more involved so they
are proven in the next section

We begin with the denition which has already been given in Chapter 	

Denition
x follows

y	 C
 
"  k  stable x  k	 C 	   k  stable y  k	 C 	
 invariant x  y	 C   k  y  k   x  k	 C 	
  k  y  k  x  k next x  k	 C 	
The subscript on the follows operator will be omitted when the ordering relation is
clear from context
 For the following properties the ordering relation will be understood to
be  
 Also we will use x  y  and z for program variables and j and k for free variables


 Properties for Posets
A poset is a set of elements with an ordering relation that is reexive transitive and
antisymmetric
 An example of a poset is the set of sequences ordered by the prex ordering
relation

When the ordering relation of follows eg  	 denes a poset on the types of the
variables it enjoys the following properties

Constants For free variables j and k  x is a program variable	 we have
k follows j 	 invariant k " j 	 
	
k follows x 	 invariant x " k	 
	
x follows k 	 invariant x " k	 
	
Transitivity
x follows y	  y follows z 	  x follows z 	 
	
Reexivity
x follows x 	 	  k  invariant x " k	 	 
	
Antisymmetry
x follows y	  y follows x 	  invariant x " y	 
	
Monotonicity
f is monotonic	  x follows y	  f  x follows f  y	 
	
Stable Fixed Point An element k is said to be a 
xed point of a function f when
k " f  k 
 As a shorthand we dene the set FP of xed points FP " f k  k " f  k  k g
x follows f  x 	   k  k 
 FP  stable x " k	 	 
	
Least Fixed Point As a shorthand we dene the set FP  x

of xed points above an
element x


FP  x

" f k  k  x

 k " f  k  k g

An element k is said to be in the 
nite closure of an element x

and a function f when
k can be otained by a nite number of applications of f ie f
i
 for some nite i 	 to
x


 As a shorthand we dene the set FC  x

of elements that are in this nite closure
FC  x

" f k   i  i    k " f
i
 x 	  k g
The following theorem gives a useful progress property as a consequence of a follows
property

f is monotonic	  FP  FC 	 x

" 	  x follows f  x 	
 x " x

  x " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 		 
	
Informally this theorem expresses a kind of induction on the poset
 It is interesting to
note that well foundedness of the poset is neither necessary nor sucient for the application
of the theorem
 There is another characterization of posets however that is easy to verify
independent of a function f 	 and that arises frequently in practice
 This characterization
is given next

A chain is a sequence of elements that can be arranged such that each element is below
the next element
 In a poset where every chain between any two comparable elements is
nite there exists a xed point above x

only when there exists a xed point above x

that is the result of the application of some nite closure to x


 Thus in any such poset
the existence of a xed point above x

is sucient for the application of the theorem
 The
set of integers is an example of such a poset
 For such a poset the least xed point theorem
can be restated more simply as follows
f is monotonic	  FP  x

" 	  x follows f  x 	
 x " x

  x " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 		 
	
  Properties for Lattices
A poset is called a lattice if every nite nonempty set has a greatest lower bound or meet 
denoted  	 and a least upper bound or join denoted  	  
 Equivalently a poset
is a lattice exactly when
 x  y   z  z " x  y 	   z  z " x  y 	 	
Sequences ordered by prex ordering do not form a lattice because a least upper bound
is not dened for all pairs of sequences
 In particular two sequences in which neither is
a prex of the other have no common upper bound
	 An example of a lattice is the set of
integers ordered by the at most relation


For posets that are lattices follows enjoys the following properties in addition to those
given in Section 



Strengthening  Weakening
 k  stable z  k	 	  x follows y	
 x  z follows y  z 	  x  z follows y  z 	 
	
Junctivity Finite For nite nonempty I 
 i  i 
 I  x
i
follows y
i
	
  f i  i 
 I  x
i
g follows  f i  i 
 I  y
i
g	
  f i  i 
 I  x
i
g follows  f i  i 
 I  y
i
g	 
	
Union Finite For nite nonempty I 
 i  i 
 I  x
i
follows y 	
  f i  i 
 I  x
i
g follows  f i  i 
 I  x
i
g	 
	
Intersection Finite For nite nonempty I 
 i  i 
 I  x follows y
i
	
  f i  i 
 I  y
i
g follows  f i  i 
 I  y
i
g	 
	
 Properties for Complete Lattices
A lattice is said to be complete if all sets including innite and empty ones	 have a least
upper bound and a greatest lower bound
 Complete lattices always have a top an element
above all others	 and a bottom an element below all others	

The set of integers ordered by at most does not form a complete lattice because there
is no top or bottom
 The empty set does not have a least upper bound or a greatest lower
bound
	 An example of a complete lattice is the powerset of a nite set S  ordered by
subset inclusion
 Any two elements have a least upper bound the union	 and a greatest
lower bound the intersection	
 The top is the set S and the bottom is the empty set

For complete lattices the nite properties given above are universal


Junctivity Universal
 i  x
i
follows y
i
	   f i  x
i
g follows  f i  y
i
g	
  f i  x
i
g follows  f i  y
i
g	 
	
Union Universal
 i  x
i
follows y 	   f i  x
i
g follows  f i  x
i
g	 
	
Intersection Universal
 i  x follows y
i
	   f i  y
i
g follows  f i  y
i
g	 
	
 Proofs of Basic Theorems
The theorems listed above can all be derived from the denition of follows 
 The complete
proofs for two of these theorems monotonicity and least xed point	 are given here as an
illustration of how such a proof can be carried out
 These two theorems arise frequently in
proofs involving follows 

  Monotonicity
f is monotonic	  x follows y	  f  x follows f  y	
We prove the consequent f  x follows f  y  by proving each of the conjuncts in the
denition of follows 

f  x follows f  y 	  k  stable f  x  k	 	   k  stable f  y  k	 	
 invariant f  x  f  y	   k  f  y  k   f  x  k 	
  k  f  y  k  f  x  k next f  x  k 	
Prove
 k  stable f  x  k	 	

Proof
f  x " k
	 f choice of j g
x " j  f  j " k
next f assumption  stable x  k	 g
x  j  f  j " k
 f f is monotonic g
f  x  f  j  f  j " k
 f calculus g
f  x  k

Prove
 k  stable f  y  k	 	
Proof Same as above


Prove
invariant f  x  f  y	
Proof
true
	 f assumption invariant x  y	 g
invariant x  y	
 f f is monotonic g
invariant f  x  f  y	

Prove
f  y  k   f  x  k

Proof There exists a j such that
f  y  k
	 f choice of j g
y " j  f  y  k
	 f calculus g
y " j  f  y  k  f  j  k
 f calculus g
y  j  f  y  k  f  j  k
  f assumption  y  k   x  k  with k " j g
x  j  f  j  k
 f f is monotonic g
f  x  f  j  f  j  k
 f calculus g
f  x  k

Prove
f  y  k  f  x  k next f  x  k
Proof There exists a j such that
f  y  k  f  x  k
 f calculus g
f  y  k
	 f choice of j g
y " j  f  y  k
	 f calculus g
y " j  f  j  k
	 f assumption invariant x  y	 g
y " j  f  j  k  x  y
	 f calculus g
y " j  f  j  k  x  j
next f assumption y  k  x  k next x  k g
f  j  k  x  j

 f f is monotonic g
f  j  k  f  x  f  j
 f calculus g
f  x  k

   Least Fixed Point
f is monotonic	  FP  FC 	 x

" 	  x follows f  x 	
 x " x

  x " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 		
We dene a constant m as follows
m " Min k  k 
 FP  FC 	 x

 k 	
After justifying the use of min in the denition of m  we will prove the following
results
m " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 	 
	
x " x

  x  m 
	
stable x  m	 
	
It is clear that the least xed point theorem follows from the conjunction of these results

Prove FC  x

is a wellfounded set and hence any nonempty subset has a minimum
element as in the denition of m 	

Proof By induction we show  i  i    f
i
 x

 f
i 
 x

	 

Base case  i "  	

true
	 f invariant x  f  x 	 g
invariant x  f  x 	
 f denition of invariant g
initially x  f  x 	
	 f assumption initially x " x

	 g
initially x  f  x 	  initially x " x

	

 f calculus g
initially x

 f  x

	
	 f x

is a constant g
x

 f  x

	 f denition of f

g
f

 x

 f  x

Inductive step

f
i
 x

 f
i 
 x

 f f is monotonic g
f
i 
 x

 f
i 
 x

Now FP  FC 	 x

is a nonempty from the assumptions	 subset of a wellfounded
set
 Hence it has a minimum ie m is well dened	


Prove 	
m " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 	
Proof First we show by induction
 j  j 
 FC  x

  k  k 
 FP  x

 k  j 	 	
Base case  i "  	
  k  k 
 FP  x

 k  f

 x

	
 k  k 
 FP  x

 k  f

 x

	
	 f denition of f

g
 k  k 
 FP  x

 k  x

	
	 f denition of FP  x

g
true
Inductive step

 k  k 
 FP  x

 k  f
i
 x

	
 f f is monotonic g
 k  k 
 FP  x

 f  k  f
i 
 x

	 	
 f denition of FP  x

g
 k  k 
 FP  x

 k  f
i 
 x

	

In particular for m since m 
 FC  x

	 we have
 k  k 
 FP  x

 k  m 	
But m 
 FP  x

by denition of m	 so
m " Min k  k 
 FP  x

 k 	

Prove 
x  x

  x  m
Proof First we show
 i  i    x  f
i
 x

  x  f
i 
 x

	
Consider any i   
x  f
i
 x

 f f is monotonic g
f  x  f
i 
 x

  f assumption  f  x  k   x  k g
x  f
i 
 x

Inducting on integers this gives the property
 k  k 
 FC  x

 x  x

  x  k 	
And hence since m is in FC  x

	
x  x

  x  m

Prove 
stable x  m	

Proof
x  m
	 f f is monotonic g
x  m  f  x  f  m
	 f denition of m  m 
 FP  x

g
x  m  f  x  m
next f assumption f  x  k  x  k next x  k g
x  m

 The Earliest Meeting Time
 Problem Denition
The earliest meeting time problem has been discussed in 
 The problem is to schedule
a meeting for a group of people at the earliest time that is acceptable to every member of
the group
 Time is considered to be a nonnegative integer value
 Associated with every
member i is a function f
i
that maps any time t to the rst available time for member i
at or after time t 
 From the denition of f
i
 it follows that f
i
is monotonic and moreover
that  t  t  f
i
 t 	 
 An example of these functions for a group of three people is plotted
in Figure 


Initially the program variable t is 
 The progress requirement is that eventually this
variable is set to the earliest meeting time provided one exists
 The safety requirement
is that this be a xed point of the system
 More formally the problem specication is
assuming  k   i  k " f
i
 k 	 	  to establish
t "    t " Min k   i  k " f
i
 k 	  k 	 
	
stable t " Min k   i  k " f
i
 k 	  k 		 
	
  A Solution
We will consider here a specication of a solution
 The solution can be implemented by a
distributed system in our model of computation by a central component that keeps track
of the current proposed time and a collection of components one for each member of the
group


f  .t
3
2f  .t
1
f  .t
t
f.t
f.t  =  t
(Max i :: f  .t)i
Figure 
 Some example earliest available meeting time functions for a group of people

The specication of our solution is
initially t "  	 
	
t follows Max i  t
i
	 
	
 i  t
i
follows f
i
 t 	 
	
Operationally each component that corresponds to a member of the group is responsible
for updating t
i
with the next available time for component i at or after time t 
 The central
component takes the maximum of these values and updates t 

 Proof of Solution
Lemma 
t follows Max i  f
i
 t 	
Proof
true
	 f property   i  t
i
follows f
i
 t 	 g
 i  t
i
follows f
i
 t 	
 f nite junctivity of follows g

Max i  t
i
	 follows Max i  f
i
 t 	
	 f property  t follows Max i  t
i
	  and transitivity of follows g
t follows Max i  f
i
 t 	

We now use the stable xed point theorem and the least xed point theorem since all
the f
i
are monotonic and a xed point exists by assumption	 to conclude
t "    t " Min k  k " Max i  f
i
 k 	  k 	
 stable t " Min k  k " Max i  f
i
 k 	  k 		
Now this result is equivalent to the required specication as established from the fol
lowing equivalence
k " Max i  f
i
 k 	 	  i  k " f
i
 k 	
	 f denition of max g
 i  k  f
i
 k 	   i  k " f
i
 k 	 	  i  k " f
i
 k 	
	 f property of f
i
 k  f
i
 k g
 i  k " f
i
 k 	   i  k " f
i
 k 	 	  i  k " f
i
 k 	
	 f calculus g
 i  k " f
i
 k 	   i  k " f
i
 k 	
	 f calculus for a nonemtpy group g
true

Notice that the entire specication both safety and progress	 is established from a single
follows property as given in Lemma 
	

 Proofs of Channel Properties
In Chapter  the properties that dene channel behavior were given along with some
corollaries derivable from these properties
 In this section we show the derivation as an
exercise in the use of follows properties
 We begin with a reminder of the basic denitions
common to all channel types before proving the corollaries for unordered channels ordered
channels writeonce channels and monotonic channels


 Denitions Common to All Channel Types
These denitions have already been given in Section 


 They are repeated here for
convenience

deln " jD j 
	
sentn " jS j 
	
delp 	 deln   
	
sentp 	 sentn   
	
delp  del " D deln    
	
sentp  sent " S sentn    
	
  Properties that Depend on MessageDelivery Discipline
Unordered Channels
Property
D follows
v
S 
	
Lemma  Length  jj  of sequences is monotonic with respect to the multiset subset v 
ordering
X v Y  jX j  jY j	
Proof The lemma follows directly from the denition of the multiset subset v 	 ordering
on sequences


Corollary
deln follows sentn 
	
Proof
D follows
v
S
 f Lemma 
  length is monotonic with respect to v g
jD j follows jS j

	 f 
  deln " jD j  and 
  sentn " jS j g
deln follows sentn

Corollary
delp follows sentp 
	
Proof
deln follows sentn
 f monotonicity of predicate x   with respect to  g
deln   follows sentn  
	 f 
  delp 	 deln    and 
  sentp 	 sentn   g
delp follows sentp

Ordered Channels
Property
D follows

S 
	
Lemma  The multiset subset v  ordering on sequences is monotonic with respect to
the pre
x   ordering
X  Y  X v Y
Proof
# i    i  jX j  X i  " k 	
" f denition of   X  Y   i    i  jX j  X i  " Y i  	 g
# i    i  jX j  Y i  " k 	
 f denition of   X  Y  jX j  jY j g
# i    i  jY j  Y i  " k 	


Corollary
D follows
v
S
Proof
D follows

S
 f Lemma 
  monotonicity of v with respect to  g
D follows
v
S

Lemma  For all k and all j    the predicate jX j  j  X j  " k on a sequence
X is monotonic with respect to the pre
x   ordering on sequences
X  Y  jX j  j  X j  " k  jY j  j  Y j  " k	
Proof The lemma follows directly from the denition of the prex  	 ordering on
sequences


Corollary
 j  j    deln  j  D j  " k follows sentn  j  S j  " k 	
Proof
D follows

S
 f Lemma 
  monotonicity of predicate with respect to  g
 j  j    deln  j  D j  " k follows sentn  j  S j  " k 	

 Properties that Depend on Sender Discipline
WriteOnce Channels
Property
invariant sentn   	 
	
Lemma 
invariant deln   	

Proof
true
	 f 
  invariant sentn   	 g
invariant sentn   	
 f 
  deln follows sentn g
invariant deln   	

Lemma 
delp 	 deln " 
sentp 	 sentn " 
Proof The proof follows immediately from Lemma 
 the property 
 of writeonce
channels and the common channel denitions


Lemma 
 For all k  the predicate jX j "   X   " k on a sequence X is monotonic
with respect to the multiset subset v  ordering on sequences for sequences of length less
than or equal to 
jX j    jY j    X v Y  jX j "   X   " k  jY j "   Y   " k	
Proof
jX j "   X   " k
 f assumption  X v Y g
jY j     j  jY j  j    Y j  " k 	
	 f assumption  jY j   g
jY j "    j    j    Y j  " k 	
	 f calculus g
jY j "   Y   " k

Corollary
delp  del " k follows sentp  sent " k

Proof
D follows
v
S
	 f 
  invariant sentn   	 g
D follows
v
S 	  invariant sentn   	
	 f Lemma 
  invariant deln   	 g
D follows
v
S 	  invariant sentn    deln   	
	 f 
  deln " jD j  and 
  sentn " jS j g
D follows
v
S 	  invariant jS j    jD j   	
 f Lemma 
  predicate is monotonic on sequences of length less than
or equal to  g
jD j "   D   " k follows jS j  S   " k
	 f 
  deln " jD j  and 
  sentn " jS j g
deln "   D   " k follows sentn "   S   " k
	 f calculus g
deln "   D deln    " k follows sentn "   S sentn    " k
	 f Lemma 
  delp " deln "  	  and sentp " sentn " 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Chapter 
Certicates and Testing
In this chapter we examine how certicates can be useful for component testing and debug
ging
 Mappings from the simple certicates introduced at the end of Chapter  to runtime
checks are given
 We discuss the feasibility of the automatic generation of the code for these
runtime checks
 The practical support for these specication constructs is considered in
the context of a real programming language and framework namely C and the CORBA
distributedobject standard

	 Certicates as Assertions
One of the dening characteristics of certicates is locality
 A certicate can refer only
to local variables to messages sent by the component and to messages delivered to the
component by the messagepassing layer
 The intent is that certicates correspond to
component specications where no requirements are placed on the environment in which the
component is placed
 They represent both an obligation on the part of the implementor to
provide a certain functionality and a promise to the environment that a certain functionality
is provided
 Since the validity of such certicates depends only on the implementation of
the component in question these certicates can be validated in isolation before deploying
or releasing the component for general use

In addition to their role as formal specications of component behavior certicates can
also play an important role in the testing of an implementation
 For a component that
corresponds to a single implementation object the predicates of a certicate contain only
expressions local to a single implementation object
 It is therefore relatively easy to check
at run time that the properties described are maintained by the component
 When used in
this manner certicates are akin to assertions in sequential programming
 They can play

a similar role in the debugging phase of software development

The only requirement on a certicate for it to be runtime checkable is that its predicates
all be local
 This requirement does not guarantee however that the certicate can be lo
cally veried
 For example the certicate transient hungry  P is local to the Philosopher
component P
 This certicate can be tested in the limited manner in which progress proper
ties can be tested as discussed in Section 
	
 This certicate cannot necessarily however
be unilaterally guaranteed by the component regardless of the environment in which it
is placed eg the transition out of the hungry state may require permision from other
components in the system	

	 When Should Assertions be Checked
The computational model described in Chapter  involves sequences of interleaved atomic
actions
 Each action maps a system state to a new system state
 The certicates described
in this chapter involve predicates on these states
 The validity of a certicate therefore
depends on the state before and after the execution of an atomic action
 The intermediate
states during the execution of an atomic action are not observable and so are not required
to satisfy the certicates

We associate these atomic actions with the methods that are executed as the result of
the delivery of an RPC request
 Even though execution of the method may cause several
messages to be sent the entire method is considered to be a single atomic action
 It is
therefore sucient to examine the component state at the beginning and the end of these
methods
 Such an approach is valid under certain constraints on the messagepassing layer

A set of constraints sucient to ensure the validity of this approach has been given in 

Our computational model meets these requirements allowing us to treat methods as atomic
blocks

	  A Practical Instance of Our Model CORBAcompliant DSOM
In the remainder of this chapter we describe how the use of certicates for component test
ing can be supported in an instantiation of our distributed computing model namely the
CORBA standard
 The CORBA standard is an attractive vehicle for these ideas because
component descriptions with certicates	 are entirely consistent with the object declara
tions of the CORBA IDL
 Since CORBAcompliant systems provide IDL parser to generate
stub code from these declarations it is appealing to consider using these parsers to also
automatically generate runtime checked assertions from the certicates
 These assertions

would be embedded in the stub code provided by the IDL parser
 In the cases where the
code cannot be entirely automatically generated eg see Section 
	 the required stubs
and hooks can be generated and the programmer would then be required to ll in the
functionality

There are many commercially available CORBAcompliant systems
 Most of these sys
tems support a variety of implementation languages usually at least C C Smalltalk
and Java	
 We will present our runtime translations in the context of IBMs CORBA
compliant SOMDSOM system where the component implementations are given in C

The translation of certicates into runtime checks does not depend on the use of this partic
ular commercial system
 No special features of SOMDSOM are critical to the tractability
of the approach outlined in this chapter
 This choice was made for illustrative purposes
only as our goal was to demonstrate the practicality of our approach

	 Mapping of Specication Variables
The local variables listed in a component description and referred to by certicates	 do
not necessarily correspond directly to implementation variables
 Also the channel histo
ries and associated functions such as delp and sent 	 are not directly available to the
implementation in a CORBA application
 Thus a mapping between these specication or
ghost 	 variables and the implementation variables must be provided

The relationship between local variables in the component description and implemen
tation variables must be dened by the implementor
 For each variable in the component
description a function is written that calculates the value of the variable from the imple
mentation state
 For example the component description of Philosopher contains three
boolean local variables thinking hungry and eating
 The implementation of this compo
nent however may contain a single integer variable status that denes the objects state
 when it is thinking  when it is hungry and  when it is eating
 For each specication
variable the implementor of the component must provide a function mapping the value of
the integer implementation variable to a value for the specication variable
 As an example
of such a mapping for the local variable thinking in a CORBA application written in C
and using IBMs DSOM see Program 

 The type PhilosopherData is a standard data
structure used in DSOM to encapsulate the member data of the implementation object
 The
header of this function can be automatically generated but the code requires knowledge of
the intended relationship between implementation state and specication state

On the other hand the relationship between the functions on channel histories eg

boolean evaluatethinking PhilosopherData d

if dstatus 		 
return true
else
return false

Program 
 A mapping from the implementation state to a specication variable

delp and sent 	 and the implementation channel state is common to all implementations

No user code is required to support these functions as they can be provided automatically
as part of a library
 For example the class given in Program 
 records the history of
messages delivered on a particular incoming channel
 The class is parameterized according
to the message type of the channel

template class MessageType
struct InChannelHistory 
SequenceMessageType A
int deln void 
return A
getlength

MessageType del void 
return A
last

void update MessageType m 
A
appendm


Program 
 A data structure for representing the history of an incoming channel

As an optimization the entire channel history need not be preserved
 For example for
an outgoing monotonic channel where we care only about the value of sent  it is sucient
to record only this maximum	 value
 The class given in Program 
 implements such an
optimization

Each RPC target is associated with a unique incoming channel history
 Every method
is modied by the addition of an update of the corresponding channel history
 The message
delivered to the component is appended to the channel history
 For example consider the

template class MessageType
struct OutMonotonicChannelHistory 
boolean sentp
MessageType sent
OutMonotonicChannelHistory void 
sentp 	 false

void update MessageType m 
assert m 	 sent
sentp 	 true
sent 	 m


Program 
 An optimized data structure for representing the history of an incoming
channel

method m in Program 

 The stub for this method including the signature and the rst
line where a variable somThis is declared and assigned	 is automatically generated by
the IDL parser
 This method takes three arguments x y and a somSelf and ev are
handles used by the underlying DSOM system	
 These arguments correspond to a message
type in the specication of the component
 The value of the message is constructed from
the arguments by a programmerdened function evaluate m msg
 Everything but this
function and the denition of the message type can be automatically generated from the
components certicates

Whenever software is used to test software there are two concerns eciency and cor
rectness
 The rst concern is not critical as we expect certicatebased testing to occur as
part of the debugging of components and not during their actual use after deployment
 For
calculations that are prohibitively expensive for example see the component specications
in Chapter 	 programmer intervention is certainly required to reduce their complexity

The greater the degree of programmer intervention however the greater the issue of cor
rectness becomes a concern
 In general however the code a programmer is required to
provide as part of the testing of a component is relatively simple compared to the com
plexity of the entire component implementation
 Also this code can be written entirely as
traditional sequential code to which all the verication techniques that have been developed
in that area can be applied
 We postulate therefore that it is easier to write correct code
for certicatebased testing than to write correct code for a component implementation


typedef struct 
definition of message type goes here
 mMessageType
InChannelHistorymMessageType mchannel
mMessageType evaluatemmsg long x
short y
ArgStruct a

mMessageType retval
implementation of message evaluation goes here
return retval

SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev
long x
short y
ArgStruct a

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
mchannel
update evaluatemmsgxya
implementation of method m goes here

Program 
 Code to maintain the channel history of an RPC target

	 Support for Safety Properties
	 Fundamental Safety Certicates
The initially certicate describes a predicate that is true at the beginning of the compu
tation
 Since no action has had a chance to execute this predicate must be established at
the time of component instantiation
 For a component that corresponds to a single imple
mentation object this certicate must be established by that objects constructor
 To test
that this certicate holds then it is sucient to test it at the end of the constructor

The other fundamental safety operator is next 
 To test for the violation of a next
property the states before and after an action must be examined
 This requires a test both
at the beginning of a method and at its end
 Notice that the testing at the beginning of
the method is meant to capture the state before the action that is before the delivery
of the RPC request
 The channel state must therefore be updated only after this initial

examination of state
 For a certicate p next q and a method m the framework to test
for the violation of this certicate is given in Program 

 Recall that the signature of this
method and the rst line that declares and assigns a variable somThis	 are both part of
the DSOM implementation
 They are provided automatically as procedure stubs by the
IDL parser
 Also this method does not have any arguments somSelf and ev are used by
the underlying DSOM system	 so a unary value is appended to the channel storing the
incoming message history

InChannelHistory mchannelunary
boolean p ComponentData 
boolean q ComponentData 
SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
boolean prepredicate 	 psomThis
mchannel
update unaryset
implementation of method m goes here
assert prepredicate  qsomThis

Program 
 Testing a method for a next property

The situation is complicated somewhat by the generality of the denition of the next
operator
 This denition permits the inclusion of free variables over which the expression can
be universally quantied
 For example for a local variable x and a free variable n we might
have the certicate x " n next x  n 
 The naive translation of such a quantication
however yields an innite number of predicates to be tested before and after the execution
of the method

This complication is avoided in our simple safety certicates of monotonicity bounded
ness unquantied next  and functional next properties
 Because these restricted forms
of next and invariant do not contain free variables and hence universal quantication	
they can be easily even automatically	 mapped onto the skeleton illustrated in Program 



	  Monotonicity
The monotonicity of a local variable x can be veried by comparing the value of the variable
at the beginning and end of each method
 Recall that x is a specication variable so
its value must be computed from the actual local state using the programmersupplied	
function evaluate x
 The skeleton for the modication of a generic method m is given in
Program 


SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
int prexvalue 	 evaluatex somThis
mchannel
update unaryset
implementation of method m goes here
assert prexvalue 	 evaluatex somThis

Program 
 Testing a method for the monotonicity of x

In the case where the monotonic variable does not have a type with an established
ordering relation the less than or equal to operator would have to be written for this class
using the usual C operator overloading techniques

	 Boundedness
A boundedness property is an invariant property
 To check that this property is never
violated it must be checked at the end of the constructor and at the end of every method
body
 For example consider the certicate that states that local variable x is bounded
above by a function of local variables y and z

invariant x  f  y  z 		
To check this certicate each method is modied as shown in Program 
 the last line has
been added	
 The additional line is also added to the constructor
 The function f  y  z 	 is
provided by the programmer in the body of the function evaluate f
 The evaluation of
the predicate in the certicate is provided by the programmer in the body of the function
evaluate bound 
 The number  is used to distinguish bounds when a component has
more than one boundedness certicate
	

int evaluatex ComponentData 
int evaluatey ComponentData 
char evaluatez ComponentData 
int evaluatef int int
boolean evaluatebound ComponentData data

return evaluatexdata 	 evaluatefevaluateydata
evaluatezdata 

SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
mchannel
update unaryset
implementation of method m goes here
assert evaluateboundsomThis

Program 
 Testing a method for the boundedness of x

As with monotonicity a less than or equal to operator can be dened for the type of
the bound variables and invoked through overloading

	 Unquantied next
An unquantied next property is a next property that does not contain any free variables

The certicate eating next eating  thinking is an example of such a property
 The
predicates in these unquantied certicates can be calculated directly from the component
state
 Therefore the framework given in Program 
 can be used directly to validate an
unquantied next property

		 Functional next
In a functional next  the values of the dummy variables are uniquely determined by the
values of the program variables in the prepredicate
 Recall that a functional next property
with dummy variables from the set I and local variables from the set V has the property
 i  i 
 I   f  p  i " f  V  	 	

We introduced the operator adjacent and used preprimed variables to indicate values
from the previous state
 We write adjacent p where p is a predicate on variables in
V 

V 

This notation has the benet of eliminating all dummy variables by replacing them by
their functional evaluation using prepredicate variables
 To check that the execution of a
method satises the constraint expressed by this certicate the values of the preprimed
variables are stored at the beginning of the method and then used in the evaluation of the
predicate at the end of the method
 For a component with a functional next certicate
with for example two preprimed variables every method m would be modied as shown in
Program 


boolean p ComponentData  int char
SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
int prexvalue 	 evaluatex somThis
char preyvalue 	 evaluatey somThis
mchannel
update unaryset
implementation of method m goes here
assert psomThis prexvalue preyvalue

Program 
 Testing a functional next property with two preprimed variables

	 Support for Progress Properties
	 Fundamental Progress Certicate
Unlike safety properties progress properties cannot be violated by any nite trace
 It is
therefore not possible to report an error at run time due to the violation of a progress
property
 It is possible however to report a warning when a progress property has failed
to be satised in a very long time
 Although such a warning is not proof of the existence
of an error in the implementation of a component it can be a useful starting point for the
examination of an implementation that is believed to be erroneous


Recall that the fundamental progress property in our model is transience
 This certicate
states that if the predicate is true it will eventually become false
 For example recall the
example used in Section 
 where the Philosopher component is in the eating state for a
nite length of time ie transient eating 	
 The transience of a predicate is monitored
by testing it at the end of every method

The class given in Program 
 records the pertinent information for detecting the
possible nontransience of a predicate
 The time at which the predicate last became true
or the time of the initiation of the computation	 is recorded as well as whether or not the
predicate is currently true

struct TransientPredicate 
boolean holds
long timestamp
boolean predicateComponentData 
void initialize ComponentData data

holds 	 predicatedata
if holds
timestamp 	 getcurrenttime

void update ComponentData data

boolean b 	 predicatedata
if holds  b
timestamp 	 getcurrenttime
holds 	 b


Program 
 A class for recording the history of a transient predicate

This information can be used to signal a possible error if the current time exceeds
the time stamp of a transient predicate by some threshold debugging value
 Alternatively
this information can be used after interruption of execution to determine which transient
predicates were true and how long that had been the case
 More detailed histories including
which methods had executed since the predicate became true can also be maintained to
further aid in debugging

The certicate of transience like the next operator may contain free variables and
universal quantication
 As with the next operator the presence of universal quantica

tion makes an automatic mapping of a certicate of transience to some program fragment
dicult
 In practice however many transient properties of components can be expressed
as simple ie unquantied transient or functional transient 	 certicates

	  Unquantied Transience
An unquantied transient property does not contain any free variables
 The certicate
transient eating is an example of such a property
 The predicates in these unquantied
certicates can be calculated directly from the component state

In general for a predicate p  a variable can be declared to store the history of p
using the class given above Program 
	
 This variable is initialized in the component
constructor and then updated at the end of every method
 Program 
 shows how an
unquantied transient property can be mapped to the stub code produced by the IDL
parser
 The method somDefaultInit is the constructor automatically generated by the
IDL parser
 The only modication to this method required by our runtime certicate
checking is the addition of the last two lines that initialize the transient predicate	
 No
tice that the only code the programmer must enter is an implementation for the function
evaluate p
 The rest can be generated automatically

	 Functional Transience
Given a component state there is a single assignment of values to free variables such that
the predicate of a functional transient property can be true
 There are two ways then
for the transience specied by the certicate to be satised

 The predicate can cease to be true for any assignment of values to the free variables


 The assignment of values to free variables required for the predicate to be true	 can
change

The special syntax of functional transient certicates permits a special mapping from
these expressions to program fragments
 The values of the dummy variables specied in
the certicate can be calculated at the end of each method body
 Every time the predicate
is true and these values are di!erent from the previous values they are stored along with a
time stamp
 The di!erence between the time stamp of the last update and the current time
can be used to trigger an alarm that warns the tester that the expression may be failing
to be transient
 The class used to store the history of a functional transient property is
shown in Program 



TransientPredicate p
boolean evaluatep ComponentData data

implementation of predicate evaluation goes here

SOMScope void SOMLINK somDefaultInit Component somSelf
somInitCtrl ctrl

ComponentData somThis
ComponentInitSOMObjectsomDefaultInitsomSelf ctrl
local Component initialization code goes here
p
predicate 	 evaluatep
p
initialize somThis

SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
implementation of method m goes here
p
update somThis

Program 
 Code to test an unquantied transient property

In general for a functional transient predicate with an associated set of dummy vari
ables	 a variable can be declared to store the history of this predicate using the class given
above
 This variable is initialized in the component constructor and then updated at the
end of every method
 Program 
 shows how a functional transient property with a
single free variable of type integer	 can be mapped to the stub code produced by the IDL
parser
 The only coding required of the programmer is an implementation of two functions

 The functional calculation of the free variables from the component state


 The evaluation of the predicate given the current component state and the values of
the free variables

Notice that a functional transient property directly species both these functions
 In a
certicate
 i  i 
 I  i " f
i
 V 	 in transient p I V 	

template class SetType
struct FunctionalTransientPredicate 
boolean holds
long timestamp
SetType freevars
SetType dummiesComponentData 
boolean predicateComponentData  SetType
void initialize ComponentData data

freevars 	 dummiesdata
holds 	 predicatedatafreevars
if holds
timestamp 	 getcurrenttime

void update ComponentData data

SetType v 	 dummiesdata
boolean b 	 predicatedatav
if holds  b  v 	 freevars  b
timestamp 	 getcurrenttime
holds 	 b
freevars 	 v


Program 
 A class for recording the history of a functional transient predicate

the former is given by the f
i
and the latter is given by p 

If there is more than one free variable a structure is dened that contains all these
variables
 This structure must contain an implementation of the not equal operator
 This
data structure however is highly regular and can be automatically generated from the
certicate
 An example of the data structure corresponding to two free variables one
integer and one character is given in Program 


This data structure replaces the declaration of DummyVars in Program 
 as an integer
in this case	
 No other code is impacted
 The history of the functional transient property
is initialized and updated as shown in Program 

 As before the programmer must
supply functions to calculate the values of the free variables given the component state and
evaluate the predicate given the component state and the values of the free variables


typedef int DummyVars
FunctionalTransientPredicateDummyVars p
DummyVars calculatepdummies ComponentData data

DummyVars retval
implementation of calculation of free variable values goes here
return retval

boolean evaluatep ComponentData data DummyVars d

implementation of predicate evaluation goes here

SOMScope void SOMLINK somDefaultInit Component somSelf
somInitCtrl ctrl

ComponentData somThis
ComponentInitSOMObjectsomDefaultInitsomSelf ctrl
local Component initialization code goes here
p
dummies 	 calculatepdummies
p
predicate 	 evaluatep
p
initialize somThis

SOMScope void SOMLINK m Component somSelf
Environment ev

ComponentData somThis 	 ComponentGetDatasomSelf
implementation of method m goes here
p
update somThis

Program 
 Code to test a functional transient property


struct DummyVars 
int i
char j
int operator 	 const DummySet d

if d
i 		 i  d
j 		 j
return 
else
return 


Program 
 Denition of a class for multiple dummy fariables of a functional transient
property


Chapter 
Services
In this chapter we introduce services
 A service is a frequently used paradigm for component
interaction in distributed systems
 Two examples of such services are given and their
integration in our model is explored
 One of these services is then used in the development
of a larger example application illustrating the utility of this approach to paradigm reuse

 Introduction
The certicatebased approach described in previous chapters emphasizes the specication
of the individual component
 This specication is given as a unilateral guarantee of compo
nent behavior regardless of the environment in which it is placed
 Component properties
then are veried in isolation of the rest of the system
 This promotes the specication
implementation and proof reuse of the individual components
 System properties on the
other hand are proven as the conjunction of the local component properties
 Because of
their dependence on all the constituent component properties the proofs of these system
properties are dicult to reuse in di!erent contexts

All but the most trivial	 system properties are established and maintained through the
coordination of component interactions
 If these component interactions can be structured
in a meaningful way often the arguments of correctness for the distributed system can be
simplied
 Many algorithms impose this structuring through a small collection of abstrac
tions that are frequently reused
 These abstractions then gure prominently in both the
informal exposition of the algorithm as well as its formal verication

For example consider a distributed system responsible for maintaining a certain tem
perature in a building
 The system consists of a collection of thermostat components that
alternate between two states o! and on
 A thermostat changes state depending on the

local temperature of its immediate environment A thermostat is o! when the environment
temperature is above a certain threshold and it is on when the environment temperature
is below a certain threshold
 The steadystate of the building temperature then follows
directly from the certicates capturing individual component properties
 If however we
impose the further requirement that at most twothirds of the thermostats can be on at the
same time eg perhaps this is required by the electrical system	 the thermostats must
now coordinate their transitions from o! to on and viceversa
 The protocol used for this
coordination can be expressed using certicates but a compositional proof is required to
establish that the system invariant is maintained
 This chapter addresses the question of
how to reduce the burden of this compositional proof

As mentioned above one technique for simplifying the proof is to introduce an abstrac
tion that structures the component interactions
 The maintenance of a system property is
then an immediate consequence of this structuring
 Since they are properties of component
communication these abstractions cannot be captured in a single component but must be
derived from the specications of a collection of components
 It is desirable then to reuse
this derivation whenever applicable
 A qualitative observation is that a relatively small
number of abstractions are used in a relatively large number of distributed algorithms
 It is
therefore reasonable to expect that extensive reuse is possible
 We will call these abstrac
tions services
 
In this chapter we examine two simple services tokens and logical clocks
 The choice
of these services is signicant
 They represent two very powerful mechanisms for structur
ing component interactions
 The former is often used to represent the indivisibility and
indestructibility of a limited resource
 The latter is often used to establish consistency and
causality relationships
 It has been our experience that these services reappear frequently
in the development of distributed algorithms
 For example they can be used to simplify
the proof and exposition of algorithms as varied as mutual exclusion dining philosophers
 global snapshots  Byzantine generals  and termination detection  

On the other hand these two services do not comprise an exhaustive list of useful
services
 They are given as an illustration of the use of services and their integration in our
model
 Another example might be partial orders where components are connected in an
acyclic directed graph structure
 Edge directions can change but components coordinate
these modications so as to maintain the acyclicity of the graph
 This service is useful
for the symmetry breaking that is commonly required for fair arbitration
 For example
components that are higher in the partial order could be given priority until their request
is satised at which point they move to the bottom of the partial order


We conne our discussion in this chapter however to tokens and logical clocks
 Each is
characterized informally and their utility in distributed algorithms outlined
 Each service
is then characterized formally using the certicates given in previous chapters
 Since a
service represents an abstraction of a communication discipline we give the certicate
based specication for all the components participating in this discipline
 The key properties
embodied by these services are then derived from the conjunction of these specications

We conclude with an extended example illustrating how a service can be used to simplify
the construction of a larger application

 Tokens

  Specication
A token is an indivisible unit that can be in the possession of at most a single component

Thus the number of components with tokens is bounded above by the number of tokens
in the computation
 Tokens can neither be created nor destroyed
 Thus the total number
of tokens in a computation is constant
 In this way tokens capture a limited resource
allocation paradigm A component with a token has access to the resource a component
without a token does not

Let the total number of tokens in a system be tokens 
 Let the number of tokens held
initially by a component c be c initial hold 
 The rst property of tokens is that their total
number is constant and this number is the sum of the number of tokens each component
holds initially

invariant tokens "  c  c initial hold 		 
	
Let the number of tokens held by a component c be c holding and let the number of
tokens in a channel from component c to component c

be c c

	 holding 
 The second
property of tokens is that the number of tokens held by any component or any channel is
nonnegative

 c  invariant c holding   	 	 
	
 c c

 invariant c c

	 holding   	 	 
	
Notice that this specication is given entirely in terms of safety properties
 There are
no guarantees concerning token circulation
 These guarantees are protocol dependent and
can be layered on top of this fundamental specication
 An example of such a layering is
given in Section 
 where a token manager for enforcing mutual exclusion is developed



   Utility of Tokens
A system invariant that is a conjunction of local component invariants can be derived di
rectly from those component properties
 For example consider the system of thermostat
components from the introduction to this chapter
 Say each component has a local vari
able that represents how much energy that component has expended
 If each component
maintains a local invariant that this energy consumption is bounded above by some value
it follows that the total energy consumption of the entire system is also bounded above by
some value ie the sum of the local values	

Tokens on the other hand capture a system property that is a disjunction of local
component invariants
 For example recall the constraint on the system of thermostats
that only two thirds of them can be on at the same time
 The system invariant that there
exist at most n thermostat components that are on can be captured through the use of
tokens A thermostat component must possess a token in order to be on
 By controlling
the number of tokens in the system the number of thermostats that are on is constrained
as a consequence

This constraint is an example of the general problem of mutual exclusion
 The problem
of mutual exclusion is to control access to a limited resource
 Since tokens are indivisible
they are a natural expression of the safety property of mutual exclusion


  Certicate Specication
Tokens are dened to circulate among a collection of components all of which satisfy the
TokenHolder specication given in Program 


Component TokenHolder 
local const 	 initialhold  int number of tokens initially held
local vars 	 holding  int number of tokens currently held
rpc targets 	 tokunary unordered
neighbors 	 N  set of Component TokenHolder
certificates 	
Invariant
holding 	 
Invariant
holding 	 initialhold  SUMc in N  delnctok
 SUMc in N  sentnctok

Program 
 Description of a TokenHolder component

Each TokenHolder component has a local constant initial hold that gives the num
ber of tokens held initially by the component as well as a local variable holding that

gives the number of tokens currently in the components possession
 A token is received
from another component when a message is delivered to the tok RPC target
 Conversely
a token ceases to be in a components possession when that component sends a message to
another TokenHolder component


  Proof of Specication
Prove 
invariant tokens "  c  c initial hold 		
Proof
tokens
" f denition of tokens g
 c  c holding 	   c c

 c c

	 holding 	
" f denition of c c

	 holding g
 c  c holding 	   c c

 sentnc c

 tok	 delnc c

 tok	 	
" f invariant c holding " c initial hold   c

 delnc

 c tok	 	
  c

 sentnc c

 tok	 		 g
 c  c initial hold   c

 delnc

 c tok	 	  c

 sentnc c

 tok	 	 	
  c c

 sentnc

 c tok	  delnc

 c tok	 	
" f calculus g
 c  c initial hold 	

Prove 
 c  invariant c holding   	 	
Proof This follows directly from the certicates of the TokenHolder component


Prove 
 c c

 invariant c c

	 holding   	 	

Proof
c c

	 holding
" f denition of c c

	 holding g
sentnc c

 tok	 delnc c

 tok	
 f channel property g


 Logical Clocks

 Specication
A logical clock is a monotonically nondecreasing counter maintained by a component
 Each
component maintains its own logical clock
 The key property of the interaction of clocked
components is that all messages exchanged are time stamped
 An outgoing message is
time stamped with the value of the logical clock of the component sending the message

Conversely the time stamp of an incoming message is used to update the logical clock of the
component receiving the message
 The logical clock of the component receiving the message
is set to a value greater than the time stamp of the incoming message while maintaining
its monotonicity	

Logical clocks are a partial encoding of causality
 More specically logical clocks disallow
certain chains of causality between components
 Since components can interact only by
messages this restriction reects a requirement on the messages that components exchange

The fundamental system property resulting from the use of the logical clock protocol is that
messages are not received at an earlier logical time than when they are sent
 That is a
component with a logical clock value of n has not received any messages that were sent
after a logical ie local to the sending component	 time of n 

The diagram in Figure 
 illustrates the use of logical clocks
 The history of actions
at a component is represented by a vertical time line while a message exchanged between
components is represented by a dashed arrow
 The key system property is reected in the
observation that all dashed arrows are directed upwards ie messages are received later
than they are sent	

With each component x  we associate a history x  H  of actions
 This history is a
sequence of tuples
 Each tuple consists of the entire state of the component including the
logical time and the number of messages sent and delivered
 For example x  H i  time is

time
component
logical
Figure 
 Graphical time line for a collection of components exchanging messages

the logical time at the i
th
tuple
 To simplify the notation we consider components to have
a single channel between them this allows channels to be identied by the sending and
receiving component without mentioning the RPC target	
 The system property that no
messages are delivered at an earlier logical time than when they were sent is expressed by
the following equation
invariant x  H i  time " t  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k 
 j  y  H j  time  t  y  H j  sentny  x 	  k 		 
	

  Utility of Logical Clocks
Logical clocks reect a simple causality relationship
 As discussed above the use of logical
clocks entails a discipline of time stamping outgoing messages and of updating the logical
clock according to incoming messages
 As a result of this discipline a component with a
logical time of n has not received any messages sent at a logical time greater than n 

One of the useful consequences of this system property is that a valid global snapshot
 Chapter  can be recorded quite easily
 It is sucient for all components to record
their state when their logical clocks have reached a particular value
 Global snapshots are
especially useful for the detection of stable properties such as termination or deadlock	

Logical clocks can also be useful in algorithms that rely on a total ordering of actions

The value of a components logical clock is used as the basis of this total ordering with
ties broken in any arbitrary manner	
 For example a mutual exclusion algorithm might be

based on granting access to the critical section to components in the order in which their
requests were made in logical time	  
 The fact that logical time advances by some
positive amount guarantees that all components are eventually granted access to the critical
section


 Certicate Specication
In a system that uses logical clocks each component must satisfy the Clocked specication
given in Program 


Component Clocked 
local vars 	 time  int local time
H  sequence of tuples Ht
time delnx sentnx
neighbors 	 N  Component Clocked
certificates 	
Stable
sentpc  sentc 	 k
Stable
time 	 k
Transient
time 	 k
Invariant
Ac in N  delpc  time  delc
sentnc 	 k  time 	 t Next
sentnc 	 k v sentnc 	 k  sentc 	 t
Invariant
sentnc 	 k 		
Ei  Hi
time 	 Sk  Hi
sentnc 	 k 

Program 
 Description of a Clocked component

Each Clocked component has a local variable for the logical time time	 and a local
variable for its associated history H	
 The values a component sends to its neighbors
RPC targets are monotonically nondecreasing as is its logical time
 On the other hand
a components logical time is guaranteed to change ie increase	
 A components logical
time is greater than the time stamp of any message delivered to it
 Messages sent are time
stamped with a components current logical time
 Finally the history sequence is updated
at least frequently enough to reect each individual send action
 That is for every send
action performed by the component there is a tuple in the history with the time of the
time stamp of that message



 Proof of Specication
Prove 
invariant x  H i  time " t  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k 
 j  y  H j  time  t  y  H j  sentny  x 	  k 		
Proof The specication is trivially true for k "  
 So consider k   
x  H i  time " t  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k
	 f assumption  k   g
x  H i  time " t  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k  x  H i  delny  x 	  
	 f channel property g
x  H i  time " t  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k  x  H i  delpy  x 	
 f property  invariant H i  time delpc	  H i  time  H i  delc		 g
t  x  H i  dely  x 	  x  H i  delny  x 	 " k
	 f channel property  H i  delc	 " Dc	H i  delnc	    g
t  Dy  x 	k     x  H i  delny  x 	 " k
 f deln is monotonic g
delny  x 	  k  Dy  x 	k     t
 f channel properties g
sentny  x 	  k  S y  x 	k     t
 f property  invariant sentnc	  k   i  H i  time " S c	k   
 H i  sentnc " k 		 g
 i  y  H i  time " S y  x 	k     y  H i  sentny  x " k 	
 S y  x 	k     t
 f calculus g
 i  y  H i  time  t  y  H i  sentny  x 	 " k 	
 f both time and sentn are monotonic g
 j  y  H j  time  t  y  H j  sentny  x 	  k 	

 Example
 Central Token Manager
In this section we illustrate how the services introduced above can be used in the develop
ment of a larger application
 In particular we develop a solution to the mutual exclusion
problem based on a central token manager



 Mutual Exclusion with Tokens
The task is to provide mutually exclusive access to a critical section for a collection of
components
 We solve this problem by requiring that a component possess a token before
entering the critical section
 By virtue of the token service described in Section 
 the
number of components in the critical section is bound by a constant the number of tokens
in the system	
 The system consists of an arbitrary number of TokenClient components
and a single TokenManager responsible for controlling access to the critical section	
 Let
C be the set of TokenClient components and let M be the TokenManager
 The topology
of connections for this system is illustrated in Figure 


TokenManager
TokenClient TokenClient TokenClientTokenClientTokenClient
M
C
Figure 
 Topology of the central token manager solution for mutual exclusion

When a TokenClient wishes to enter the critical section it sends a request to the
TokenManager
 When it receives a token in reply the TokenClient can enter the critical
section
 Upon exiting the critical section the TokenClient must return the token to the
TokenManager
 It is the responsibility of every TokenClient to eventually exit the critical
section and release the token	
 It is the responsibility of the TokenManager to satisfy token
requests in a fair manner ie every TokenClient that sends a request eventually gets a
token	

One of the required properties of this system is that the number of TokenClient compo
nents in the critical section is bounded above by a constant N 
 A TokenClient component
c is in the critical section exactly when the boolean c critical is true

invariant  # c  c 
 C  c critical 	  N 	 
	

The progress property for the system is that token requests are eventually satised

 c  c 
 C  sentncM  req	  k   delnM  c tok	  k 	 
	

  Component Specications
Initially the TokenManager holds all the tokens
 The TokenManager maintains a queue of
components with outstanding requests
 It has two RPC targets req to receive token
requests and tok to receive tokens
 The component description of TokenManager is given
in Program 


Component TokenManager 
local const 	 initialhold  int tokens held initially
local vars 	 R  queue of Component TokenClient
clients with pending requests
holding  int number of tokens held by manager
rpc targets 	 requnary unordered
tokunary unordered
neighbors 	 C  set of Component TokenClient
certificates 	
Invariant
initialhold 	 N
Invariant
holding 	 
Invariant
holding 	 initialhold  SUMc in C  delnctok
 SUMc in C  sentnctok
Invariant
sentnctok 	 delncreq
Invariant
sentnctok  delncreq 		 empty
R  Ei  Ri 	 c
Invariant
empty
R 		 Ec in C  sentnctok  delnctok

Program 
 Description of the TokenManager component

A TokenClient on the other hand initially holds no tokens
 It has a boolean variable
critical that is true exactly when the component is in the critical section
 A TokenClient
does not enter the critical section without holding a token
 Also a TokenClient eventually
returns all tokens that are sent to it
 The component description of TokenClient is given
in Program 


Notice that both TokenManager and TokenClient satisfy the TokenHolder component
specication given in Section 



 Proof of Solution
Prove  Tokens are constant


Component TokenClient 
local const 	 initialhold  int tokens held initially
local vars 	 holding  int number of tokens held by clients
critical  boolean is component in critical section
rpc targets 	 tokunary unordered
neighbors 	 M  Component TokenManager
certificates 	
Invariant
initialhold 	 
Invariant
holding 	 delnMtok  sentnMtok
sentnMtok Follows delnMtok
Invariant
critical 		 holding  

Program 
 Description of the TokenClient component

Proof Follows from all components satisfying the TokenHolder specication


Prove 
 c  c 
 C  sentncM  req	  k   delnM  c tok	  k 	
Proof
sentncM  req	  k
  f channel property g
delncM  req	  k
  f see below g
sentnM  c tok	  k
  f channel property g
delnM  c tok	  k
So we must prove
 c  c 
 C  delncM  req	  k   sentnM  c tok	  k 	
This property is established by induction from the following property
delncM  req	  sentnM  c tok	  sentncM  req	  k
  sentnM  c tok	  k  

delncM  req	  sentnM  c tok	  sentncM  req	  k
 f component property sentnM  c tok	  delncM  req	 
empty  R   i  Ri  " c 	 g
empty  R   i    i  jRj  Ri  " c 	  sentncM  req	  k
  f Aside  g
sentnM  c tok	  k  

Aside 
empty  R   i    i  jRj  Ri  " c 	  sentncM  req	  k
  sentnM  c tok	  k  
Proof The result follows by induction from
empty  R  R  " c  sentnM  c tok	  k   sentnM  c tok	  k   
	
 i    i  jRj  empty  R  Ri  " c   empty  R  Ri    " c 	 
	
Both 
 and 
 follow from Lemma 



Lemma 
empty  R  R  " c  R " R

 sentnM  c tok	  k
  R " tail  R

 sentnM  c tok	  k  
Proof We make use of the following progresssafetyprogress PSP	 theorem in the proof
of this lemma
p   q	  r next s	  p  r   q  r	  r  s		
In particular we use the following variation of PSP
r   q	  r next r  s	  invariant q  r		  r   s	
The lemma is proven by the application of this PSP variation with the following substi
tutions
r " empty  R  R  " c  R " R

  i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	 " n
i
	  sentnM  c tok	  k 
	
q "  i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	  n
i
	 
	
s " R " tail  R

 sentnM  c tok	  k   
	

Thus we must establish the leadsto next  and invariant properties required by
the PSP variation
 The next property follows immediately from the certicates of the
TokenManager component
 The invariant property follows immediately from predicate
calculus
 Only the leadsto property remains as a proof obligation

empty  R  R  " c  R " R

  i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	 " n
i
	  sentnM  c tok	  k
 f calculus g
empty  R   i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	 " n
i
	
 f invariant  empty  R 
 c  c 
 C  sentnM  c tok	  delncM  tok	 		 g
 c  c 
 C  sentnM  c tok	  delncM  tok	 	
  i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	 " n
i
	
  f channel property  c  delncM  tok	 follows sentnM  c tok	 	 g
 i  i 
 C  delni M  tok	  n
i
	


Chapter 
Example A Distributed Auction
In this chapter we present an example that illustrates the utility of certicates in the
verication phase of the development of a distributed application
 An operational overview
of the problem and solution is presented followed by a formal specication of the system and
of the individual components using certicates
 A formal proof is given that the composition
of these components meets the required system specication

The application considered is an example of a reactive rather than transformational	
system
 That is we are interested not only in the nal solution but also in the computa
tional path by which that solution is reached

 The Problem
We wish to design a system to support a multiparty distributed auction
 The aim of the
auction is to sell a particular item to the bidder willing to pay the highest price

There are therefore two things to be determined the identity of the winning bidder
and the price of the item
 The former is uniquely determined by each bidders interest
in the item and nancial resources
 The latter however is nondeterministic
 The only
requirement on the sale price is that it be fair to both the bidders and the auctioneer
 That
is the nal sale price must be low enough that the winning bidder can a!ord it yet be high
enough that no other bidder can beat it

Another constraint on the system concerns the manner in which the auctioneer is per
mitted to determine this fair sale price
 We disallow a solution requiring all bidders to
communicate their maximum bid to the auctioneer which could then select the winner and
set a price between this winners maximum bid and the next highest maximum bid	
 Such
a solution requires bidders to trust the auctioneer in a manner that is not realistic in a

commercial setting
 We also disallow collusion on the part of the bidders to preselect the
winner

The auctioneer is permitted to set a minimum price below which the item will not be
sold

 A Solution
We implement here a solution with a single centralized auctioneer and a distributed collec
tion of some arbitrary number of bidding processes
 The participating bidders communicate
only with the auctioneer
 This topology reects the physical distribution of participants in
the auction
 A hierarchical approach is also possible and would have scalability benets
but it is not pursued here

The auctioneer begins by announcing the starting price to all participating bidders
 If
all bidders decline to place a bid the auction terminates without a sale
 Otherwise the
auctioneer updates the price as bids arrive
 When the current price is beaten by a bid the
new price is announced to all bidders other than the bidder placing this high bid
 This
process is repeated until all the bidders receiving a new price announcement decline to bid

The bidder with the remaining high bid is the winner and the current price is the nal sale
price

Each bidder has a maximum value it is willing to bid
 This value may be limited by
the bidders nancial resources or interest in the item being sold
 This maximum value
is considered to be constant for the auction
 The bidder receives announcements of the
current price from the auctioneer
 If the current price is greater than or equal to the
bidders maximum bid it replies by declining to bid

On the other hand if the current price is less than the maximum bid the bidder may
reply with a higher bid
 The value of the bid submitted is nondeterministically chosen from
the interval greater than the current price but less than or equal to the bidders maximum
bid
 Also this reply need not be immediate
 This permits human interaction where a
human bidder must decide the value of bid to submit

Like a traditional auction there is no guarantee that the winning bidder pays the min
imum fair price that is the price equal to the second highest maximum bid among the
participants	
 No bidding strategy can guarantee that the winner will buy the item for this
minimum fair price since this bid may be placed by the bidder with the second highest
maximum bid requiring the winner to bid more

The bidder state of having received a price announcement that it can beat is a mixed

node  in the bidder protocol
 That is from this state either a message can be received
by the bidder ie a new price announcement	 or a message can be sent by the bidder
ie a competitive bid	
 This behavior arises from the bidders use of a clock to generate
a timeout signal as discussed in Section 



 Auctioneer and Bidder Components
Having described operationally the functionality of the auctioneer and bidders we now
present the component descriptions of these objects
 The certicates for each component
are given separately from the rest of the component description for readability

 Auctioneer
The auctioneer accepts two types of messages integer used to encode a bid	 and unary
used to decline further bidding	
 There is a single constant Start representing the initial
o!ering price of the item
 In addition there are three variables price the current highest
bid	 winner the bidder with the current highest bid	 and sold whether or not the auction
has completed with a sale	
 The auctioneer has two RPC targets bid and nobid
 The
former is used to submit a bid and the latter is used to decline further participation in
the auction
 Finally as neighbors the auctioneer maintains B a set of Bidder components

This component description is summarized in Program 


Component Auctioneer 
local const 	 Start  int
local vars 	 price  int
winner  Component Bidder
sold  boolean
rpc targets 	 bid int monotonic
nobid unary writeonce
neighbors 	 B  set of Component Bidder

Program 
 Description of the Auctioneer component

  Bidder
A bidder accepts a single type of message an integer representing the current highest bid

There is a single constant for each bidder MaxBid representing the maximum amount this

bidder is willing to pay for the item
 A bidder has a single RPC target newprice used to
announce the current highest bid
 Finally each bidder has a single neighbor the auctioneer
A	
 This component description is summarized in Program 


Component Bidder 
local const 	 MaxBid
rpc targets 	 newprice int monotonic
neighbors 	 A  Component Auctioneer

Program 
 Description of the Bidder component

 Certicates
In this section we give the certicatebased specication of the Auctioneer and Bidder
components introduced above
 We use the abbreviation  np  to denote the RPC target
newprice of the Bidder component

Auctioneer
The following certicates characterize the behavior of the Auctioneer component where
x is understood to range over all elements of B the set of participating bidders	
 The price is monotonically increasing

price " n next price  n
 The price is bounded below by the initial o!er price

invariant price  Start	
 The price increases above the initial o!er price only if it has been bid by a component
designated the winner	
 All other components are sent an announcement of this new
price

invariant price  Start  delpwinner  bid	  delwinner  bid	 " price
 sentpwinner np	  Start  sentwinner np	  price
  x  x " winner  sentpx np	  sentx np	 " price 		

 When the price is the initial o!er price all participating bidders are sent an announce
ment with this price

invariant price " Start   x  sentpx np	  sentx np	 " price 		
 The price is bounded below by all the bids that have been received

invariant   x  delpx  bid	  price  delx  bid	 		
 The item is sold exactly when all bidders apart from the winner have declined to bid
and the price is greater than the initial o!er price

invariant sold 	  x  x " winner  delpx nobid	 	
 delpwinner nobid	  price  Start	
Bidder
The following certicates characterize the behavior of the Bidder component
 A bidder declines further participation in the auction exactly when a price is an
nounced that is greater than or equal to the bidders maximum bid

invariant delpAnp	  delAnp	  MaxBid 	 sentpAnobid		
 A bidder eventually responds if the announced price is below the bidders maximum
bid

transient n  MaxBid  delpAnp	  delAnp	 " n
 sentpA bid	  sentA bid	  n		
 A bidder does not bid more than its maximum bid

invariant sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  x  MaxBid	
 Proof of Correctness
 Problem Specication
A rigorous proof of correctness must have a rigorous specication
 We therefore restate the
informal specication given in Section 
 in more precise terms

We use A to denote the single Auctioneer component in the system and the variable
x to range over all Bidder components participating in the auction


 If possible there is a winner
 This progress condition states that if there is a bidder
that can a!ord the initial o!er price the auction eventually terminates with a sale

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	   A sold 
	
 If no winner is possible the item is declined
 This progress condition states that
if there is no bidder that can a!ord the initial o!er price the auction eventually
terminates without a sale

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	    x  delpx Anobid	 	 
	
 The selling price is fair to the auctioneer
 If an item sells the selling price could not
be beaten by any bidder other than the winner

invariant A sold   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 		 
	
 The winner can a!ord to purchase the item
 If an item sells the winner of the auction
can a!ord the selling price

invariant A sold  A winner  MaxBid  A price	 
	
 Bidding an amount is a commitment to pay that amount if the bid is accepted
 This
requirement excludes solutions in which all bidders transmit their MaxBid value and
the auctioneer picks the winner and a price between the two greatest bids received

Such a solution is not acceptable in a scenario where the auctioneer is not implicitly
trusted by the bidders

sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n   A price  n 
	
  Composition of Auctioneer and Bidder Specications
The composition of these components to form our distributed auction consists of the binding
of the neighbor values of the participating components
 The set B in the Auctioneer
component is assigned the set of participating Bidder components
 Conversely the neighbor
value A of each bidder is assigned the single Auctioneer component in the system

Recall the simple compositional rule for certicates A certicate of a component is
also a certicate of any system of which that component is a part
 Thus the certicates
given in Section 

 are also certicates for the entire system
 We repeat these certicates

here because unlike their presentation in Section 

 the identication of channels is no
longer clear from context but must be made explicit
 Also as an abbreviation we will
omit the keyword invariant 
 Our convention is that properties that are not next  stable
transient  or leadsto are understood to be invariant

Auctioneer
A price " n next A price  n 
	
A price  A Start 
	
A price  A Start  delpA winner A bid	  delA winner A bid	 " A price
 sentpAA winner np	  A Start  sentAA winner np	  A price
  x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 
	
A price " A Start   x  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 
	
 x  delpx A bid	  A price  delx A bid	 	 
	
A sold 	  x  x " A winner  delpx Anobid	 	
 delpA winner Anobid	  A price  A Start 
	
From these equations in particular 
	 
	 and 
		 we can immediately derive
the following corollaries
sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  A price 
	
sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  A Start 
	
 x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 
	
Bidders
delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 sentpx Anobid	 
	
transient n  x  MaxBid  delpA x np	  delA x np	 " n
 sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n		 
	
sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  x  MaxBid 
	
From these properties in particular 
		 we derive the following corollary
n  x  MaxBid  delpA x np	  delA x np	 " n  
delpA x np	  delA x np	  n	  sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n	 
	

 Proof of Solution
We begin with a few lemmas which are helpful in establishing the result

Lemma 

 x  delpA x np	  delA x np	  n 	  A price  n
Proof
 x  delpA x np	  delA x np	  n 	
 f channel properties g
 x  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  n 	
 f 
	 sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  A price g
A price  n

Lemma 
 Increasing Price Lemma
 x  n  x  MaxBid  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " n 	   A price  n
Proof
 x  n  x  MaxBid  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " n 	
  f channel property g
 x  n  x  MaxBid  delpA x np	  delA x np	  n 	

 x  n  x  MaxBid  delpA x np	  delA x np	 " n	
 delpA x np	  delA x np	  n	 	
 f Lemma 
 g
A price  n   x  n  x  MaxBid  delpA x np	  delA x np	 " n 	
  f 
	 g
A price  n   x  delpA x np	  delA x np	  n	
 sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n	 	
 f Lemma 
 g
A price  n   x  sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n 	
  f channel properties g
A price  n   x  delpx A bid	  delx A bid	  n 	

 f 
	  x  delpx A bid	  A price  delx A bid	 	 g
A price  n

Prove 

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	   A sold
Proof Using the Increasing Price Lemma we prove the following result
A price " n   A price  n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	
A price " n

A price " n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 		
 A price " n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 		
 f 
	  x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 g
 x  x " A winner  n  x  MaxBid  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " n 		
 A price " n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 		
  f Increasing Price Lemma 
 g
A price  n
 A price " n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 		

A price  n   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	
From the result above we can conclude by induction since A price is an integer and
all MaxBid values are nite	
true    x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	
Now we conclude the proof
 x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	   x  A Start  x  MaxBid 		
  f Aside 
 g
 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	  A sold

Since Start and MaxBid values are constants this means we have the desired property
 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	   A sold
This concludes the proof with the exception of establishing the aside mentioned above


Aside 

 x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	
  x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	   A sold
Proof
 x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	   x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
	 f 
	  x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 g
 x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  x  MaxBid 	
  x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
  f channel properties and stable A Start  x  MaxBid	 g
w   x  x " w  delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 	
  x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
	 f 
	 delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 sentpx Anobid	 g
w   x  x " w  sentpx Anobid	 	 	   x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
  f channel properties and stable A Start  x  MaxBid	 g
w   x  x " w  delpx Anobid	 	 	   x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
  f Aside 
 and stable delpx Anobid		 g
w   x  x " w  delpx Anobid	 	 	  A price  A Start
	 f Aside 
 A price  A Start  delpA winner Anobid	 g
w   x  x " w  delpx Anobid	 	 	  delpA winner Anobid	
 A price  A Start
	
 x  x " A winner  delpx Anobid	 	  delpA winner Anobid	
 A price  A Start
	 f 
	 A sold 	  x  x " A winner  delpx Anobid	 	
 delpA winner Anobid	  A price  A Start g
A sold


Aside 

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	   A price  A Start
Proof
 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	
 f 
	 A price  A Start g
A price  A Start    x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	  A price " A Start	
 f 
	 A price " A Start   x  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 g
A price  A Start
  x  A Start  x  MaxBid  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A Start 	
  f Increasing Price Lemma 
 g
A price  A Start

Aside 

A price  A Start  delpA winner Anobid	
Proof
A price  A Start
	 f 
	 A price  A Start  delpA winner A bid	
 delA winner A bid	 " A price g
A price  A Start  delpA winner A bid	  delA winner A bid	 " A price
 f channel properties g
A price  A Start  sentpA winner A bid	  sentA winner A bid	  A price
 f 
	 sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  x  MaxBid g
A price  A Start  A price  A winner  MaxBid
 f 
	 A price  A Start  sentpAA winner np	
 sentAA winner np	  A price g
sentpAA winner np	  sentAA winner np	  A winner  MaxBid
 f channel properties g
delpAA winner np	  delAA winner np	  A winner  MaxBid
	 f 
	 delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 sentpx Anobid	 g
sentpA winner Anobid	

 f channel properties g
delpA winner Anobid	

Prove 

 x  A Start  x  MaxBid 	    x  delpx Anobid	 	
Proof For any Bidder Component x 
A Start  x  MaxBid
 f 
	 sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  A Start g
sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  x  MaxBid
  f channel properties g
delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid
	 f 
	 delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 sentpx Anobid	 g
sentpx Anobid	
  f channel properties g
delpx Anobid	
In conjunction with the stability of delpx Anobid	  this gives the desired result


Prove 

A sold   x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	
Proof
A sold
 f 
	 A sold   x  x " A winner  delpx Anobid	 	 g
 x  x " A winner  delpx Anobid	 	
 f channel properties g
 x  x " A winner  sentpx Anobid	 	
	 f 
	 delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	 sentpx Anobid	 g
 x  x " A winner  delpA x np	  delA x np	  x  MaxBid 	
 f channel properties g

 x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	  x  MaxBid 	
	 f 
	  x  x " A winner  sentpA x np	  sentA x np	 " A price 	 g
 x  x " A winner  A price  x  MaxBid 	

Prove 

A sold  A winner  MaxBid  A price
Proof
A sold
 f 
	 A sold  A price  A Start g
A price  A Start
 f 
	 A price  A Start  delpA winner A bid	
 delA winner A bid	 " A price g
delpA winner A bid	  delA winner A bid	 " A price
 f channel properties g
sentpA winner A bid	  sentA winner A bid	  A price
 f 
	 sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  x  MaxBid g
A winner  MaxBid  A price

Prove 

sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n   A price  n
Proof
sentpx A bid	  sentx A bid	  n
  f channel properties g
delpx A bid	  delx A bid	  n
 f 
	  x  delpx A bid	  A price  delx A bid	 	 g
A price  n


	 CORBA Instantiation of Solution
This system has been implemented in a commercially available CORBAcompliant dis
tributed object framework namely IBMs SOMDSOM
 The IDL descriptions of these ob
jects are given here in Programs 
 and 

 For clarity the SOMDSOMspecic elements
of these interface declarations have been omitted here

interface Auctioneer  SOMObject 
oneway void checkin in Bidder b in short id
oneway void bid in short source in long amount
oneway void nobid in long amount

Program 
 IDL denition of the Auctioneer interface

interface Bidder  SOMObject 
oneway void newprice in long price in short id
oneway void congrats in long price
oneway void winner in long price in short id

Program 
 IDL denition of the Bidder interface

The auctioneer implementation contains a method that was not present in the compo
nent denition namely checkin
 This is a bootstrapping method used by the auctioneer
to obtain references to bidders
 The bidder implementation contains two extra methods
namely congrats and winner
 These methods are used by the auctioneer to notify
each bidder of the outcome of the auction
 These methods are not material to the cor
rectness of the application and so were excluded from our presentation and proof of the
solution

 Discussion
We have proposed specied and implemented a solution to the distributed multiparty auc
tion problem
 The solution was rigorously proven to meet the required system specication

This proof took advantage of the simple compositional rule for certicates A certicate that
is a property of a component is also a property of any system containing that component


The nal step in system verication is the proof that the implementation of each com
ponent meets the specication of that component
 One strength of certicates is that they
are locally veriable
 Thus each component can be reasoned about in isolation
 Even the
bidders transience property is established strictly as a result of bidder actions and so can
be unilaterally guaranteed by the bidder implementation

An alternate approach to this verication is the validation by testing	 of component
implementations against their specications
 As discussed in Chapter  certain certicates
can be easily translated into runtime checks and warnings
 We hypothesized that the
subset of certicates to which this translation can be applied is a signicant set accounting
for many of the certicates encountered in practice
 Indeed in the specications of the
Auctioneer and Bidder components we observe that all the certicates are either invariant
functional next  or functional transient properties
 Notice that the transient property
of the Bidder component is an example of a functional predicate with a disjunction
 Both
disjuncts imply the same value for the dummy variable so the predicate is indeed functional

It is interesting to note that the intuitive proof in which an induction and boundedness
argument is made on the price is not the approach taken for the formal proof in Section 


Such a strategy is possible for proving termination but is complicated by the fact that the
stable upper bound for the price cannot be calculated a priori
 In particular a price equal
to the second highest maximum bid value may or may not be the nal sale price depending
on the origin of the bid

This nal observation is an excellent example of the power of certicates
 A simple
description of object behavior can be captured by a few fundamental certicates sucient
to make persuasive arguments of system properties
 If a greater degree of condence is
desired these certicates can be extended in an entirely consistent manner to form a more
complete specication
 The amount of rigor that is brought to bear can be tailored to the
desired condence in the correctness of the application



Chapter 	
Example A Branch and Bound
Tree Search
In this chapter we present another example that illustrates the utility of certicates in
the development of a distributed application
 An operational overview of the problem and
solution is presented followed by a formal specication of the system and of the individ
ual components using certicates
 A formal proof is given that the composition of these
components meets the required system specication

Unlike the previous example some of the component certicates cannot be automatically
translated into ecient runtime checks
 This is because the denition of some of the
bounds potentially involves prohibitively expensive calculation
 Checks provided by the
programmer however do allow the certicates to be tested at runtime
 Also the validity
of the certicates can be formally established with an entirely local proof

 The Problem
We consider a distributed tree search based on the branch and bound algorithm  Chap
ter 
 Each node of the tree being searched has an associated value
 The goal of the search
is to identify the leaf node with the maximum value

The branch and bound tree search is based on the existence of two functions
 The
rst function yields for any node in the tree a list of that nodes children
 This function
describes how the tree branches permitting the exploration of deeper levels
 The second
function returns for any node in the tree an upper bound on the values in the subtree of
which that node is the root
 A subtree can be removed from consideration if the upper

bound associated with its root is less than or equal to the value of a known solution or a
known lower bound of the solution
 If both these functions can be calculated eciently
this approach is a useful heuristic when the number of leaves is large

The problem described in this chapter is a general one as is the presentation of the
solution
 It is applicable to any branch and bound tree search
 For illustration purposes
however we choose a particular instance of this class of problems to implement in Sec
tion 

 The particular problem we solve is a generalization of the  knapsack problem

 We are given a list of items each with an integer weight and value
 We are also given
a list of knapsacks each with an integer capacity
 The problem is to place items into knap
sacks so as to maximize the total value carried in the knapsacks subject to the constraint
that none of the knapsack capacities are exceeded

The tree to be explored is therefore the tree of partial solutions to this problem
 A
partial solution is an assignment of the rst k items to knapsacks and a list of the unused
capacities remaining for each knapsack
 The root node of the tree contains no assignments
of items to knapsacks and all knapsacks have their full capacity unused
 A leaf of the tree
contains a complete assignment of every item either to a knapsack or to not be included

The value of a node is the sum of the values of items that have been placed in knapsacks

The children of a node are the partial solutions which can be created by extending the
parent node with the placement of the next item in the list
 A bound on the subtree is
determined by relaxing the constraint of the indivisibility of the items
 The details of this
calculation are not pertinent here
 Indeed the system will be specied and proven as a
generic tree search algorithm with references to the specic problem instance ie the
generalized  knapsack problem	 only where they are helpful for clarity

 A Solution
We implement here a solution based on the masterslave paradigm
 A single master is
responsible for dividing up the tree to be explored and assigning each section to a di!erent
slave see Figure 
	
 The slaves perform the search in their respective partition and return
the result to the master

There are two sources of signicant ineciency in this approach
 The rst is the lack of
load balancing
 The partition assigned to one slave could be signicantly more expensive
to search than the others
 The computation however cannot terminate until all slaves
have reported back to the master
 This can result in poor utilization of the slaves and
suboptimal performance
 Load balancing can be improved by a simple renement
 Instead

root of subtee to be
explored by a slave
Figure 
 An example subdivision of a search tree by the master

of returning the optimal value for an entire subtree the slaves can return promising internal
nodes to the master
 The master then maintains a pool of work to be done ie the nodes
that have not yet been explored	 and idle slaves are given more work from this pool
 This
optimization complicates the presentation of the solution but does not substantially modify
the fundamental masterslave interaction
 We therefore do not include this optimization
here

The second source of ineciency in the approach outlined above is that slaves do not
share bounds
 That is one slave could be searching a subtree whose value is not better than
a lower bound already discovered by a di!erent slave
 To remedy this slaves communicate
the lower bounds they discover back to the master
 The master is then responsible for
broadcasting this information to the other slaves
 This changes the masterslave interaction
by creating a mixed node in the slave protocol
 After a slave is given a subtree to explore
it may or may not receive lower bound updates
 If none are received the slave eventually
completes the search and returns the optimal node found

 Master and Slave Components
Having described operationally the functionality of the master and slaves we now present
the component descriptions of these objects
 The certicates for each component are given
separately from the rest of the component description for readability


 Master
The master accepts two types of messages
 The rst encodes the solution discovered by the
slaves and is given generically as Tree Node
 For the generalized knapsack problem this
type is an assignment of some subset of items either to knapsacks or to be excluded from
any knapsack
 The second message type encodes lower bounds and is given generically as
Tree Node Value
 For the generalized knapsack problem this type is an integer representing
the sum of values of items included in knapsacks
 There is a single constant Prob repre
senting the original problem to be solved the root of the tree to be explored	
 In addition
there are two variables soln the optimal solution found by the slaves	 and done whether
or not the computation has terminated	
 The master has three RPC targets lb soln and
nosoln
 The rst is used to report a lower bound
 The second is used to return the optimal
solution found by a slave
 The third is used to signal that the subtree searched by the slave
does not contain the optimal solution
 Finally as neighbors the master maintains pool a
set of slave components
 This component description is summarized in Program 


Component Master 
local types 	 TreeNode TreeNodeValue
local const 	 Prob  TreeNode
local vars 	 soln  TreeNode
done  boolean
rpc targets 	 lb TreeNodeValue monotonic
soln TreeNode writeonce
nosoln unary writeonce
neighbors 	 pool  set of Component Slave

Program 
 Description of the Master component

  Slave
A slave accepts two types of messages one Tree Node	 encodes the subtree to be searched
and the other Tree Node Value	 encodes lower bounds discovered by other slaves
 Each
slave stores the subtree it is assigned in a local variable p
 This subtree is encoded by a
single node its root
 A slave has two RPC targets prob and newlb
 The former is used to
receive the subtree from the master and the latter is used to receive updated lower bounds

Finally each slave has a single neighbor the master M	
 This component description is
summarized in Program 



Component Slave 
local types 	 TreeNode TreeNodeValue
local vars 	 p  TreeNode
rpc targets 	 prob TreeNode writeonce
newlb TreeNodeValue monotonic
neighbors 	 M  Component Master

Program 
 Description of the Slave component

 Certicates
In this section we give the certicatebased specication of the Master and Slave compo
nents introduced above

We rst introduce a function that allows us to abstract away from the details of the
particular problem being solved
 It permits us to treat the application as a generic search

The function is called opt soln and for any given partial solution it returns the set of
optimal solutions which can be formed by extending the partial solution
 That is for any
node in the search tree opt soln gives the set of optimal maximal	 leaves in the subtree
with that node as its root
 For example for the generalized knapsack problem this function
gives all the assignments of items to knapsacks such that the total inside knapsacks is
maximal
 This function is a specication function and is not intended to be implemented
directly

We also introduce a function leaves  that for any node in the search tree returns the
set of leaves descended from that node
 Thus for a node P  we have
leaves P "  i  leaves P
i
	   i  opt soln P
i
 opt soln P 	
Finally we introduce a function value  that for any leaf in the search tree returns the
value of that leaf
 Thus for a problem P  we have
l 
 leaves P  value l  opt val  P  l 
 opt soln P
The specication functions opt val and opt soln can now be expressed in terms of
these two new functions
 We use the convention of ordering solutions by their value
 This
allows a maximum to be taken over solutions
 Thus for a node P  we have
opt val  P " Max l  l 
 leaves P  value l 	
opt soln P " Max l  l 
 leaves P  P 	

Notice the di!erence in the two maximum operators above
 In the rst case the maximum
is being taken over values of solutions and returns a value while in the second case it is
being taken over solutions and returns the set of solutions with the highest value
 We will
continue to use these specication functions as convenient shorthands

Master
The following certicates characterize the behavior of the Master component where x is
understood to range over pool the set of available slaves	
 All slaves are sent a subproblem and the union of these subproblems covers all possible
solutions to the original problem

invariant   x  sentpx  prob	 	
  x  leaves sentx  prob	 	 " leaves Prob	
 A new lower bound is sent to a slave only if a slave has reported that value as a lower
bound

invariant sentpx newlb	 
 y  delpy  lb	  sentx newlb	  dely  lb	 		
 The computation is complete exactly when all slaves have reported back to the master

invariant done 	  x  delpx  soln	  delpx nosoln	 		
 When the computation is done the solution is set to the maximumvalued solution
received from the slaves

invariant done  soln 
 Max x  delpx  soln	  delx  soln	 		
Slave
The following certicates characterize the behavior of the Slave component
 The slave reports back that no optimal solution exists in its subtree only if it has
received a lower bound value that is better than the best solution in its subproblem

invariant sentpM nosoln	  delpM  prob	  delpM newlb	
 opt val  delM  prob	  delM newlb		

 A lower bound is sent to the master only if a subproblem has been delivered and that
lower bound is below the best solution in the subproblem given to this slave

invariant sentpM  lb	  delpM  prob	
 sentM  lb	  opt val  delM  prob		
 A solution is sent to the master only if it is one of the optimal solutions for the
subproblem assigned to this slave

invariant sentpM  soln	  delpM  prob	
 sentM  soln	 
 opt soln delM  prob		
 The slave eventually returns either a solution or a report that the optimal solution is
not in its subtree

transient delpM  prob	  sentpM  soln	  sentpM nosoln		
 Proof of Correctness
 Problem Specication
We can now state the specication for the branch and bound tree search
 We use M to
denote the single Master component in the system

 The solution found is optimal
 This safety condition states that when the calculation
has terminated the value stored in the masters local variable soln contains one of	
the optimal solutions	 to the original problem

M  done  M  soln 
 opt soln M  Prob	 
	
 A solution is eventually found
 This progress condition simply states that eventually
the calculation does terminate

true   M  done 
	
  Composition of Master and Slave Specications
The composition of these components to form our distributed system consists of the bind
ing of the neighbor values of the participating components
 The set pool in the Master

component is assigned the set of participating Slave components
 Conversely the neighbor
value M of each slave is assigned the single Master component in the system

Recall the simple compositional rule for certicates A certicate of a component is
also a certicate of any system of which that component is a part
 Thus the certicates
given in Section 

 are also certicates for the entire system
 We repeat these certicates
here because unlike their presentation in Section 

 the identication of channels is no
longer clear from context but must be made explicit
 Also as an abbreviation we will
omit the keyword invariant 
 Our convention is that properties that are not next  stable
transient  or leadsto are understood to be invariant
 The variable x is understood to
range over the slaves in the system ie the elements of M  pool 	

Master
 x  sentpM  x  prob	 	
  x  leaves sentM  x  prob	 	 " leaves M  Prob	 
	
sentpM  x newlb	 
 y  delpy M  lb	  sentM  x newlb	  dely M  lb	 	 
	
M  done 	  x  delpx M  soln	  delpx M nosoln	 	 
	
M  done  M  soln 
 Max x  delpx M  soln	  delx M  soln	 	 
	
From property 
	 and the denition of the function leaves  we derive the following
corollaries
opt val  M  Prob	 " Max x  opt val  sentM  x  prob	 	 
	
leaves sentM  x  prob	  leaves M  Prob	 
	
Slave
sentpx M nosoln	  delpM  x  prob	  delpM  x newlb	
 opt val  delM  x  prob	  delM  x newlb	 
	
sentpx M  lb	  delpM  x  prob	  sentx M  lb	  opt val  delM  x  prob	 
	
sentpx M  soln	  delpM  x  prob	
 sentx M  soln	 
 opt soln delM  x  prob	 
	
transient delpM  x  prob	  sentpx M  soln	  sentpx M nosoln		 
	

From these properties in particular 
		 we derive the following corollary
delpM  x  prob	   sentpx M  soln	  sentpx M nosoln	 
	
 Proof of Solution
We begin with a lemma which is helpful in establishing the result

Lemma 	
delpx M  soln	  delx M  soln	 
 opt soln sentM  x  prob	
Proof
delpx M  soln	
 f channel properties writeonce	 g
sentpx M  soln	  delx M  soln	 " sentx M  soln	
 f 
	 sentpx M  soln	 
delpM  x  prob	  sentx M  soln	 
 opt soln delM  x  prob	 g
delpM  x  prob	  delx M  soln	 " sentx M  soln	
 sentx M  soln	 
 opt soln delM  x  prob	
 f predicate calculus g
delpM  x  prob	  delx M  soln	 
 opt soln delM  x  prob	
 f channel property writeonce	 g
sentpM  x  prob	  delx M  soln	 
 opt soln sentM  x  prob	
 f predicate calculus g
delx M  soln	 
 opt soln sentM  x  prob	

We are now ready to prove the result

Prove 	
M  done  M  Soln 
 opt soln M  Prob	
Proof
M  done
	 f 
	 M  done 	  x  delpx M  soln	  delpx M nosoln	 	 g

 x  delpx M  soln	  delpx M nosoln	 	
 f channel properties g
 x  delpx M  soln	  sentpx M nosoln	 	
 f 
	 sentpx M nosoln	 
delpM  x  prob	  delpM  x newlb	
 opt val  delM  x  prob	  delM  x newlb	 g
 x  delpx M  soln	   delpM  x  prob	  delpM  x newlb	
 opt val  delM  x  prob	  delM  x newlb		 	
 f channel property writeonce	 g
 x  delpx M  soln	   sentpM  x  prob	  delpM  x newlb	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  delM  x newlb		 	
 f predicate calculus g
 x  delpx M  soln	   delpM  x newlb	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  delM  x newlb		 	
 f channel properties g
 x  delpx M  soln	   sentpM  x newlb	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  sentM  x newlb		 	
 f 
	 sentpM  x newlb	 
 y  delpy M  lb	  sentM  x newlb	  dely M  lb	 	 g
 x  delpx M  soln	
   y  delpy M  lb	  sentM  x newlb	  dely M  lb	 	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  sentM  x newlb		 	
 f predicate calculus g
 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  delpy M  lb	  opt val  sentM  x  prob	  dely M  lb	 	 	
 f channel properties g
 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  sentpy M  lb	  opt val  sentM  x  prob	  senty M  lb	 	 	
 f 
	 sentpx M  lb	 
delpM  x  prob	  sentx M  lb	  opt val  delM  x  prob	  g
 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  delpM  y  prob	  senty M  lb	  opt val  delM  y  prob	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  senty M  lb	 	 	
 f predicate calculus g

 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  delpM  y  prob	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  opt val  delM  y  prob	 	 	
 f channel property writeonce	 g
 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  sentpM  y  prob	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	  opt val  sentM  y  prob	 	 	
 f predicate calculus g
 x  delpx M  soln	
  y  opt val  sentM  x  prob	  opt val  sentM  y  prob	 	 	
 f calculus  x    y  opt val  sentM  x  prob	
 opt val  sentM  y  prob	 	 	 g
 x  delpx M  soln	
   y  opt val  sentM  x  prob	  opt val  sentM  y  prob	 	 	
	 f calculus denition of max g
 x  delpx M  soln	
 opt val  sentM  x  prob	 " Max y  opt val  sentM  y  prob	  	 	
	 f 
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	 CORBA Instantiation of Solution
This system has been implemented in a commercially available CORBAcompliant dis
tributed object framework namely IBMs SOMDSOM
 The IDL descriptions of these ob
jects are given here in Programs 
 and 

 For clarity the SOMDSOMspecic elements
of these interface declarations have been omitted here

interface Master  SOMObject 
oneway void lb in long amount
oneway void soln in long amount
oneway void nosoln 

Program 
 IDL denition of the Master interface

interface Slave  SOMObject 
oneway void prob in ProblemType problem
oneway void newlb in long amount

Program 
 IDL denition of the Slave interface


 Discussion
We have proposed and specied a system that performs a generic tree search in a branch
andbound manner
 The solution was rigorously proven to meet the required system spec
ication
 This proof took advantage of the simple compositional rule for certicates A
certicate that is a property of a component is also a property of any system containing
that component
 We have also implemented the solution to a specic instance of such a
search the generalized  knapsack problem

We observe that the certicates used in the specication of the Master and Slave com
ponents are all simple certicates
 There is a single transient property in the specication
of Slave	 and it is an unquantied transient property
 We can therefore hope that as
with the distributed auction example in Chapter  much of the testing harness for this
application can be generated automatically

Some of the certicates given in this example di!er in an important way from those of
the distributed auction example
 In particular 
	 
	 and 
	 all make use of one
of the specication functions opt val or opt soln 
 Although the value of these functions
is uniquely determined by the state of the slave in particular the tree node the slave
received from the master	 it is extremely expensive to calculate
 Indeed this calculation
is precisely the task assigned to the slave
 It is therefore unreasonable to expect that an
ecient runtime check of these certicates could be automatically generated

Nevertheless it is still possible for the programmer to implement functions that approx
imate the boundedness expressed by these certicates
 For example 
	 states that any
lower bound sent by the slave is bounded above by the value of the optimal solution of the
subtree being searched
 To check that this is the case a function can be written that returns
the value of some promising leaf node in the subtree
 In fact this is the function written by
the implementor of the slave component to nd a lower bound
 A runtime check that the
leaf node returned by this function is indeed a descendant of the original tree node received
by the slave is therefore sucient to test the certicate
 Clearly such a test requires the
insight of a human programmer

On the surface there appear to be several similarities between the tree search application
presented here and the distributed auction presented in Chapter 
 Both have a single
central server and a star topology of interconnections
 The bids submitted in the auction
are analogous to the lower bounds and eventually solutions submitted in the tree search

The process of selecting a sale price is analogous to nding the leaf with the greatest value

It is curious therefore that the proof of the branchandbound tree search system is much

shorter than the proof of the distributed auction

This brevity is due to an important di!erence the di!erence in the termination condi
tion
 In the distributed auction the auctioneer cannot know whether a bidder is willing to
bid more or whether the bid is equal to that bidders maximum
 Terminating an auction
then requires there to be at most one active bidder and the rest to have declined further
participation
 In the branchandbound tree search however the nal solution or bid	 is
distinguished from the lower bounds
 It is sucient that all slaves have replied in some
manner either with a solution or with an indication that their subtree is not relevant to the
solution
 In either case this nal bid is distinctive and the computation can terminate
when all slaves have replied
 Viewing the branchandbound tree search as an auction a
lower bound reported by a slave is analogous to a promise to bid at least that amount
 A
solution reported by a slave is a bid
 Although such an auction has a simpler proof than the
one given in Chapter  it requires the winning bidder to submit its maximum bid value

As discussed in Chapter  such a solution is not satisfactory



Chapter 

Related Work
In this chapter we outline some related areas of research
 The relevant results from these
areas are compared with our own approach

 Specication Theory
Writing correct software means writing software that meets a specication
 The problem
of writing correct specications of course remains
 However specications need not be
executable by a computer which means they can be easier to write than programs for
several reasons i	 they can use highlevel intuitive abstractions that may not be available
in the implementation language and ii	 they can contain less information than a program
since they focus on the problem to be solved rather than on the method of solution
 Several
approaches to the specication of concurrent and distributed systems have emerged

 Axiomatic
Axiomatic specications dene fundamental language constructs by axioms that can then
be composed using rules of inference to form more complicated language constructs
 This
approach has been attributed to Floyd  and has been applied with success to sequential
systems
 The two primary forms of this style of specication for sequential programs are
Hoare triples  and Dijkstras weakest precondition  

Axiomatic specication has also been demonstrated to be a powerful mechanism in the
context of concurrent systems
 Martins seminal paper  gave an axiomatic denition of
synchronization primitives such as sendreceive	 in terms of boundedness progress and
fairness
 Attempts have also been made to extend the approaches taken with sequential

systems to concurrent ones
 For example Hoare triples were extended by Owicki and
Gries   with a requirement to establish noninterference between threads of execution

An extension of Dijkstras weakest precondition was the notion of weakest and strongest
invariants win and sin	 

An alternate approach to the specication of components of concurrent systems has
been the denition of component behavior given that its environment has a certain behav
ior
 That is each component in a system must behave correctly only if the other components
do
 The circularity of this reasoning has been broken by various proposals including rely
guarantee  hypothesisconclusion  assumptioncommitment  o!ersusing 
and assumptionguarantee 
 For example the assumptionguarantee approach of Abadi
and Lamport restricts the assumptions of environment behavior to safety properties
 The
modied relyguarantee approach of Manohar and Sivilotti  allows progress properties
to be part of the rely clause but requires the explicit construction of an acyclic implication
ladder
 The weakest guarantee approach of Chandy and Sanders   breaks the circu
larity by considering requirements on the entire system rather than just the environment

This approach characterizes two kinds of component properties existscomponent if any
component of a system has such a property the entire system has the property	 and all
component if all components of a system have such a property the entire system has the
property	
 Our certicates are examples of existscomponent properties

  Temporal Logic
Modal logic which has been studied since its appearance as a syllogism in Aristotles De
interpretatione adds the operators necessarily and possibly to the usual ones of propo
sitional logic eg        	 
 Temporal logic can be viewed as a branch of modal
logic in which these operators are given a temporal interpretation  
 The use of tem
poral logic to formalize the behavior of computer systems was rst proposed by Kr$oger for
sequential systems  and by Pnueli for concurrent ones 
 A computation is viewed as
a sequence of global states and properties of a system are then given as temporal properties
of these sequences
 Di!erent characterizations of the sets of sequences to which the tempo
ral operators apply lead to di!erent versions of temporal logic
 For example the structure
of the sequence may be linear or branching nite or innite
 A common formulation based
on linear temporal logic is sometimes called MannaPnueli theory  

Several specication notations with strong ties to temporal logic have been developed

The UNITY model  denes a program to be a collection of assignment statements

from which repeatedly a statement is chosen for execution
 The model gives a fairness
requirement for this selection
 Program properties are then given in terms of unless ensures
and leadsto
 TLA  standing for temporal logic of actions 	 is a logic for system
specication based on the fundamental operators  always 	 and  eventually 	 of
temporal logic
 TLA allows for the expression of di!erent fairness requirements known as
strong and weak	 as well as the hiding of variables in specications
 Both UNITY and
TLA allow for stuttering ie the repetition of global state in the trace of a computation	

Implementationlanguagespecic notations that incorporate temporal logic have also been
proposed such as COL 
 This specication language and its associated deadlock analyzer
are part of an Ada  design environment
 In  a procedural monitorbased programming
language VALET is dened with a temporal logic semantics

Our fundamental operators  initially  next  and transient 	 are based on wellknown
operators in temporal logic
 In particular   contains an excellent exposition of the
latter two
 Our derived operators  stable  invariant  and leadsto	 are also familiar from
many temporal frameworks but were inspired by their presentation in UNITY
 The follows
operator is similar to the detects operator in UNITY in that it combines safety and progress
and is similar to the method used in  to reason about continuous systems
 Unlike detects
the follows operator deals with monotonic variables
 This permits the derivation of several
useful properties eg two xed point theorems a function application theorem as well as
juncitivity union and intersection theorems	 that detects does not enjoy

 Calculational Renement
An implementation can be viewed as a specication that happens to be executable by a
computer
 That is specications and implementations are distinguished only by imple
mentability
 This view has given rise to the study of the renement from specication to
implementation in a calculational manner
 The renement calculus as it is known was
pioneered in   and 
 A calculation approach to specication renement has
also met with considerable success in the area of asynchronous VLSI design
 A CSPlike
 specication is rened through a series of program transformations into a hardware
implementation  

Component specications based on our certicates do form a lattice that is partially
ordered by renement
 The ordering relationship is given by implication and can be estab
lished using propositional calculus as illustrated in Chapters  and 
 Providing a renement
path from specication to implementation is not however the focus of our approach


 Specication Languages and Notations
Several specication notations have found use in the development of real systems
 Larch
  is a family of languages that support a twotiered style of specication
 One tier is
written in a common notation the Larch Shared Language	 while the other is written in an
interface language tailored for a particular programming notation
 Interface languages have
been designed for C  Modula  Ada  and C  among others
 Another
popular specication language SDL  is used for the description of telecommunication
systems as is the Estelle language 
 Both these notations are based on an extended
nite state machine abstraction
 VDM the Vienna Development Method	   has also
enjoyed success in its application to large systems such as the specication of PLI and Ada


These specication languages can all be used to guide the selection of test data
 They
are also consistent with the automatic generation of testing harnesses for implementations

 Software Validation
Validation is the process whereby software is tested to ensure that it complies with its
specication 
 Of course such testing cannot guarantee the absence of errors in a real
system  but it can increase programmer condence in the correctness of the system

Much work has been done on the development of test selection strategies beginning with
Goodenough and Gerharts seminal paper 
 There are two fundamental approaches
to the selection of test data i	 selecting tests based on the system specication and ii	
selecting tests based on the structure of the implementation
 Both approaches are discussed
and further classied in 

TSL Task Sequencing Language	 is a language for formally specifying the behavior
of concurrent Ada programs by specifying sequences of tasking events that can occur or
are explicitly not allowed 
 Work has been done towards the translation of these spec
ications into runtime checks 
 This work has continued in the form of Rapide an
executable architecture denition language 

Another specication language designed with automated testing in mind is ADL by
Sun Microsystems and the XOpen organization 
 Originally built for the specication
of C functions it has been extended to C and Java 
 In conjunction with a test
data description le an ADL description is used to automatically generate a test program

Functional specications are given as method postconditions however so they have a strong

clientserver bias
 ADL is therefore less appropriate for the specication of peertopeer style
distributed computations

 CORBA IDL Extensions
Some of the notations discussed above have also been proposed as extensions to CORBA
IDL
 For example a Larch interface language for use with CORBA IDL has been studied

 ADL has also been explored as an extension of CORBA IDL 
 Both approaches
base their functional specication on preconditions and postconditions of object methods

CDL Constraint Design Language	 is a language supported as an IDL extension and used
for expressing constraints on object declarations 
 This notation however is intended
to support the denition of architectural elements rather than the functional specication
of components

	 Component Technology
The modular development of programs has long been recognized as critical for the practical
development of large systems 
 At the same time the high cost of construction of
reliable software systems has made reuse of implementation architecture and reasoning	
a priority in many organizations
 The conuence of these two forces makes component
based technology attractive in a competitive software market
 One of the proponents of
commercial o!theshelf COTS	 component assembly for software systems is the Software
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University and in particular the CBS initiative
underway there	 

One of the challenges to COTS component assembly is establishing condence in the
correctness of the component being used
 The Fox project supports the concept of proof
carrying code 
 That is a proof of correctness is embedded in the assembled imple
mentation code which the user can verify
 This approach protects both the user of the
component from incorrect implementations	 and the developer of the component main
taining the privacy of the implementation code	
 It is limited however to safety properties
that are appropriate for verication by a typechecking algorithm
 The condence prob
lem has also been addressed by extending component implementations with resultchecking
code 
 The central idea is that it can be easier eg faster or more space ecient	 to
check the result of a computation than to perform the computation itself 
 These simple
checkers have been proposed and examined in a debugging role but the extension of such

checkers to a security role is an intriguing consideration


Chapter 
Conclusion
 Summary
We have presented a specication methodology that addresses three parts of the develop
ment cycle for distributed object systems i	 the specication of systems and components
ii	 the compositional reasoning used to verify that a collection of components satisfy a
system specication and iii	 the validation of component implementations
 For the speci
cation of system and component behavior we use a collection of temporal operators based
on three fundamental operators initially  next  and transient 
 From these we derived
some familiar operators invariant  stable  and leadsto as well as a less familiar but
equally useful as we have found	 operator follows 
 What characterizes our methodology
is the use of these operators in a restricted manner
 A specication statement can refer only to the state of a single component

 A single component must be able to guarantee the validity of a specication statement
regardless of the environment in which it is placed

The follows operator discussed in Chapter  has several pleasing properties as we have
demonstrated through its use in a succinct proof of the earliest meeting time problem
 The
operator is restricted to monotonic variables but this monotonicity can be dened over an
arbitrary lattice
 Thus this specialized operator can nd general applicability in distributed
systems at least to the extent that such monotonic variables occur
 For example channels
whether ordered or unordered can be viewed as monotonic variables ie either sequences
or sets of messages	
 With this interpretation follows was invaluable in the proof of
channel properties in Chapter 
 Similar proofs of these same properties without using
follows occupy  pages and are in our opinion less readable


We have characterized a subset of our general certicates that can be mapped auto
matically into a testing harness embedded in the implementation stub code
 This subset is
general enough to include the most common uses of certicates such as specifying mono
tonicity and boundedness
 This approach is consistent with CORBA IDL philosophy of
generating stub code from class declarations
 Of course our methodology is not restricted
to the CORBA framework
 However CORBA did provide a natural context for our work
as our certicates can be seen as IDL extensions and the generation of the testing harness
can be easily integrated with the CORBA development cycle
 For certicates in the char
acterized subset we have dened the mapping of these certicates into an implementation
language viz C	

Services help alleviate some of the diculties of proving properties of systems
 For ex
ample consider a system in which each component is eventually assigned a stable unique
integer
 This behavior could be proven from the protocol expressed by the individual com
ponents certicates
 However this approach requires that the result be reproven for any
combination of components that have this simple behavior as part of their specication

Instead a service that implements this system behavior can be dened and proven
 This
service can then be reused without repetition of the proof
 In this thesis we have provided
two services tokens and logical clocks
 There is anecdotal evidence that these two services
span a considerable range of applications
 The degree to which services can alleviate the
diculty of proof reuse can be quantied only by a large scale deployment of our method
ology which is outside the scope of this thesis
 We are encouraged by our work with tokens
and clocks however and believe that in practice a relatively small number of services
account for a large number of applications with nonconjunctive properties

Our experiments  the application of our methodology to a distributed auction and to a
distributed tree search algorithm  convince us of the utility of our approach
 We envision
an active marketplace of o!theshelf components dynamically assembled by consumers into
distributed systems
 The methodology presented in this thesis provides the groundwork for
the viability of such a marketplace

 Future Work
There are several natural extensions to the work presented here
 These extensions build
on our methodology and are all consistent with our fundamental goal of supporting in a
practical way the creation of correct distributed systems

First the tool described in Chapter  could be implemented
 This chapter describes a

subset of certicates that are appropriate for automatic translation into a testing harness

All implementations of the CORBA standard include an IDL parser that takes as input
the class declarations and produces as output the skeleton for the implementation code

Such a parser could be modied to accept our component descriptions as extensions to the
usual IDL declaration and produce an implementation skeleton that is augmented with the
testing harness according to the mappings given in Chapter 

Another intriguing possibility is the use of certicates as a runtime check by compo
nent consumers rather than component developers
 A component implementation could
be published or sold as an executable program a certicatebased specication and an
externally veriable checker
 The proprietary code of the vendor would be protected since
the component implementation would not be directly available to the consumer
 On the
other hand the checker code would be available to the consumer who would then be able
to verify that this checker does indeed test the maintenance of the component properties
promised by the certicates
 The security of the consumer would be protected by allowing
the component to be run in a safe mode where interactions between the component and
the rest of the system would be monitored by the veried checker

Although our certicates enjoy a simple compositional rule formal proofs of distributed
systems require some e!ort and sophistication
 It is therefore desirable to reuse these proofs
as much as possible
 For certain fundamental collections of certicates this was achieved
by the introduction of services
 Here however we have not addressed the reuse of proofs
for general systems
 If component A is a renement of component B A can always be
used in place of B and the system will behave correctly
 A component provider should
therefore be able to reuse the proofs involving any component being rened
 There is no
conceptual diculty with this reuse Renement is dened by specication implication
and proof reuse follows as a mathematical consequence
 The challenge is to provide an
infrastructure to help component implementors locate publicly available proofs that are
appropriate for them to use
 The initial steps towards such an infrastructure are outlined
in  where we describe how a universal distributed type hierarchy could be established
and maintained
 Such a system could also address the issue of the dynamic location of
components based on semantic information in addition to the syntactic information eg
component name	 used in todays technologies
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